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The termination of agency agreements in most EEC Member States is
regulated by statute, while the termination of distributorshp agreements,
with the exception of Belgium, is governed by case law. Messrs. Puelinckx
and Tielemans first survey the state of the law governing the termination of
agency and distributorshp agreements in the EEC Member States and then
discuss the efforts of the EEC to harmonize the national laws of the Member
States in the area of commercial representation. The authors conclude by
supporting the EEC harmonization efort relating to the laws regulating
agency agreements and by calling for further efforts to harmonize the laws
governing distributorsh#p agreements.
INTRODUCTION
In the area of commercial representation, one should distinguish
between agents and distributors. This maxim is particularly true when
examining terminations of agency and distributorship agreements.' A
* This article is an adaptation of a presentation delivered by Mr. Puelinckx during a
conference on Agency and Distributorship Agreements in Europe, sponsored by OYEZ IBC Ltd.
on Nov. 13, 1980 in Brussels.
** Partner, Puelinckx, De Scheemaecker & Dillemans, Brussels; Member of the Brussels Bar;,
B.A., 1961, University of Louvain; Dr. Juris., 1961, University of Louvain; Diploma Wirtschaft-
srecht, 1962, University of Cologne; M.C.L., 1965, University of Chicago.
*** Associate, Puelinckx, De Scheemaecker & Dillemans, Brussels; Member of the Brussels
Bar;, J.D., 1976, University of Antwerp; L.L.M., 1978, Harvard University.
I See generally H.J. MAIER & H. MEYER-MARSILIUS, LE REPRLSENTANT DE COMMERCE
DANS LE MARCHA COMMUN (Paris, 1961); P. CousI & G. MARION, LEs INTERMtDLAIRES DE
COMMERCE (Paris, 1963); UNION INTERNATIONALE DES AVOCATS, LA REPRKsENTATION COM-
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distributor can be described as a person or an entity who or which buys
goods for his own account and resells them to several outlets. His profit
arises from the difference between the buying price of the goods and
the resale price. There are two sets of invoices, one covering the sale
and one covering the resale. Generally a distributor operates at his
own risk and in his own name. An agent, on the other hand, is an
intermediary who procures business for another enterprise and who
acts for the account of that enterprise. Usually the agent receives a
percentage commission as compensation. The invoice covering the sale
of the product is established not by the agent but by the supplier and
sent to the customer.
In'most EEC Member States, 2 agency agreements are regulated by
specific statutes Germany was the first Member State to enact such
legislation, followed shortly by the Netherlands, France and Italy.
These statutes cover all aspects of the agency relationship, including
the termination. They usually provide for a notice period prior to ter-
mination and indemnity for the terminated agent, unless the agent has
committed a serious breach of duty justifying the termination.4
Distributorship agreements, on the other hand, have not received
much attention from the legislatures of the various Member States.
Only Belgium' has enacted a domestic statute regulating distributor-
ship agreements. In at least one Member State, France, there were un-
MERCIALE INTERNATIONALE (Brussels, 1971); A. DE THEUX, LE DROIT DE LA REPRI5ENTATION
COMMERCIALE (Brussels, 1975); W. VAN GERVEN & F. LUKOFF, COMMERCIAL AGENCY AND Dis-
TRIBUTION AGREEMENTS AND RELATED PROBLEMS OF LICENSING IN THE LAW OF THE EEC
COUNTRIES AND OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (Brussels, 1970); Jones, Practical Aspects of
Commercial.4gency and Distribution Agreements in the European Community, 6 INT'L LAW. 107
(1973). The reader should be made aware that the area of agency and distributorship agreements
is evolving. Older materials should be used with utmost caution.
2 The European Economic Community, established by the Treaty of Rome in 1957, currently
consists of ten Member States. Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxem-
bourg were the original members. The United Kingdom, Ireland, and Denmark joined in 1973,
and Greece joined on Jan. 1, 1981. For the text of the Rome Treaty, see the Treaty Establishing
the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 (entered in force Jan. 1,
1958) [hereinafter cited as EEC Treaty].
3 Belgium and the United Kingdom are exceptions. See notes 45 and 76 infra. The following
are the main legislative provisions: Germany, HANDELSGESETZBUCH [HGB] arts. 84-92(c) (Ger-
man Commercial Code, W.Ger.) and the more general provisions contained in BURGERLICHES
GESETZBUCH [BGB] arts. 164-181, 611-630, 662-676 (German Civil Code, W. Ger.); France, CODE
CIVuL [C.Civ] arts. 1984-2010 (French Civil Code) and the Decree n0 . 58-1345 of Dec. 23, 1958;
Italy, CODICE CWILE [C.c.] arts. 1742-53 (Italian Civil Code); Netherlands, WETBOEK VAN Koo-
PHANDEL [W.v.K.] arts. 74-745 (Dutch Commercial Code).
4 This requirement no longer exists in Italy. See text accompanying note 229 infra.
5 Law of July 27, 1961 on the Unilateral Termination of Exclusive Distributorship Agree-
ments of Indefinite Duration, MONITEUR BELGE Oct. 5, 1961, as amended by the Law of Apr. 13,
1971, MONITEUR BELGE Apr. 21, 1971.
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successful legislative attempts made to regulate these types of
agreements. This area, however, remains generally untouched by
legislation.6
In view of the almost complete lack of specific legislation on the
issue, courts have played an unusually important role in devising solu-
tions to meet the exigencies of disputes arising from distributorship
contracts. Their task in this area is far from accomplished. As one
eminent author in the field observes, "the courts have so far been able
to do little more than decide the immediate practical issues which have
come before them."7 A substantial part,8 and by no means the easiest
part of the questions facing the courts, relates to the termination of
distributorship agreements.
The relationship between manufacturer and distributor(s) is ex-
tremely complex. In legal terms the distributor is an independent
merchant.9 Several courts have ruled that a distributor freely assents to
the terms of the agreement, acting in his own name and on his own
behalf when selling the manufacturer's products.10 Economically,
however, the distributor is subordinated to the manufacturer whose
products he is selling. Under the provisions of a typical distributorship
agreement, the manufacturer usually determines the resale price of the
goods, the distributor's commercial policy and his own profit margin.
The brand or product which the distributor sells is the element that
attracts customers, much more than his personal skill or reputation.
This puts the distributor, to a very large extent, at the mercy of the
manufacturer. If the latter decides to terminate or no longer renew the
6 In France, a number of bills have been introduced in Parliament to deal with the regulation
of distributorship agreements. The following bills have been introduced thus far: the Daladier-
Cupper Bill of 1956, the Loch6vre Bill of 1957, the Glon Couste Bill of 1973 and the Turco Bill of
1974. For a detailed discussion of the substantive elements of these legislative proposals, see
Guyenot, L immixtion des regles du droit de travail dans les rapports entre conchdants et concession-
naires, 2 GAzETrE DU PALAIS, DOCTRINE 457, 459 (1976); J. GUtYENOT, THE FRENCH LAW OF
AGENCY AND DISTRIBUTORSHIP AGREEMENTS [hereinafter cited as FRENCH LAW OF AGENCY]
263-273 (London, 1976). None of them have been passed by Parliament. This is the result of the
lobbying groups of supporters of the manufacturers. See Carbonneau, Exclusive D1stributorshp
Agreements in French Law, INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 28 (1979).
7 See FRENCH LAW OF AGENCY, supra note 6, at 186.
8 Another important problem area for exclusive distributorship agreements is their legal va-
lidity under Community antitrust law. See EEC Treaty, supra note 2, at arts. 85 and 86. See
generally COMPETITION LAW IN WESTERN EUROPE AND THE U.S.A. (D. Gylstra man. ed. 1976);
GIDE-LoYRETTE-NOUEL, DICTIONNAIRE DU MARCH- COMMUN (with supps., 1968); A. BRAUN,
A. GLEISS & M. HIRSCH, DROIT DES ENTENTES DE LA COMMUNAUTA ECONOMIQUE EUROPAENNE
(Brussels, 1977).
9 See, e.g., Carbonneau, supra note 6, at 93 n.15.
10 Id.
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contract, the distributor is placed in a very precarious position."
The distributor, because of his status as an independent merchant,
has few, if any, legal remedies available to him. This discrepancy be-
tween the distributor's independence in legal terms and his almost total
economic dependence on the manufacturer, coupled with the almost
complete lack of legislative guidelines in this area, has caused distribu-
tors to turn to the courts for protection. As will be examined in greater
detail in the following sections, most EEC Member State courts have
worked out minimum protective measures for distributors against the
manufacturer.
The degree of protection provided for the distributor, as well as
the underlying reasoning of the courts vary widely among the various
Member States. German courts, for example, have in certain circum-
stances applied the statutory provisions regarding agency agreements1
2
to distributorship agreements.13 French courts, on the other hand, have
as yet refused to act as defacto legislative bodies on these issues and
have confined themselves to applying traditional principles of contract
law, especially the doctrine of abuse of right. 4
The difference between distributors and agents, although impor-
tant, is not the only difference which should be kept in mind. Within
the category of agents, one should also differentiate between self-em-
ployed agents and "agents-employees."' 5 The former are legally in-
dependent from the principal, while the latter are on the principal's
payroll. This distinction is especially important in the labor law field
regarding the termination of the agency relationship. Agents-employ-
ees fall under the Labor Codes of the respective Member States and,
hence, enjoy the same labor law protection as regular employees upon
termination of the contract.' 6 Self-employed agents, on the other hand,
11 As Guyenot explains it:
[When a distribution agreement terminates, a distributor's business is usually very different
from what it was before the agreement was entered into and the distributor is often unable to
maintain himself in business on his own, without established suppliers and deprived of his
customers, including those he had before he joined the manufacturer's network.
FRENCH LAW OF AGENCY, supra note 6, at 235.
12 HGB arts. 89, 89(a) and 89(b) (W. Ger.).
13 See text accompanying notes 70-74 infra.
14 See Carbonneau, supra note 6, at 92 and text accompanying notes 119-137 infra.
15 For a brief description of the different names under which the agent-employees operate in
the various Member States as well as of the regulation and statutes applicable to them, see A. DE
THEuX, supra note 1, at 17-97.
16 Labor law codes in Europe are very protective of the employee upon termination of the
employment contract by the employer. For a good general overview, see A. TUNE, LES
PRINCIPALES OBLIGATIONS DES EMPLOYEURS EN MATIARE SOCIALE DANS LES SIX PAYS DE LA
C.E.E. (Brussels, 1970).
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do not enjoy the protection offered to employees by the Labor Code.
When speaking of a commercial agent, therefore, one should spec-
ify whether the agent is a self-employed or employee agent. However,
in some countries these two categories are not clearly distinguishable.
One category may present characteristics which are normally found
only with the other category. In Italy, for example,' 7 a self-employed
agent "'8 enjoys most of the rights granted by Italian law to employees.
Under Italian law self-employed agents are fully incorporated in the
social security system. Under the Italian system, the principal enrolls
his agent with ENASARCO,' 9 a public agency charged with the ad-
ministration of social security benefits for agents. ENASARCO mainly
controls three funds: 1) severance payments available upon termina-
tion of the agent's authority; 2) agent's disability or old age pension
fund; and 3) substitute remuneration in case of the agent's illness. The
money necessary to effectuate these payments is raised by mandatory
contributions by both principal and agent to ENASARCO at a fixed
percentage of the agent's commissions. On the basis of these contribu-
tions, an Italian self-employed agent can claim social security benefits,
such as disability and old age pensions, which are normally associated
with the legal category of "employees."
The similar legal treatment in Italy of self-employed agents and
employees regarding their relationship with their principals is gov-
erned, not only by statutes,20 but primarily by collective agreements2'
entered into between representatives of the agents' unions and the prin-
cipals' associations, thus demonstrating that it is not always easy to dif-
ferentiate between self-employed agents and agents-employees.22
This article will focus on the self-employed agent and the distribu-
tor. In order to present a general picture, this article will first briefly
outline the legal position of agents and distributors upon termination of
their respective contracts in a number of EEC Member States. On the
basis of this outline, the similarities and differences between the Mem-
17 See G. LA VILLA & M. CARTELLA, THE ITALIAN LAW OF AGENCY AND DISTRIBUTORSHIP
AGREEMENTS (London, 1977).
18 In Italian "agente di commercio."
19 L'Ente Nazionale di Assistenza per Agenti e Rappresentati di Commercio (ENASARCO),
with its headquarters in Rome and several branches throughout Italy, was established in 1938. It
has recently been restructured under Decree n' 756 issued by the President of the Republic on
Aug. 4, 1971 and by Law n' 12 of Feb. 2, 1973 prescribing the character and function of
ENASARCO. See G. LA VILLA & M. CARTELLA, supra note 17, at 123-133.
20 C.c. arts. 1742-53 (Italy). See text accompanying notes 210-232 infra.
21 The so-called "Accordi Economici Collectivi" or EACS. See note 214 infra.
22 For an in-depth and comparative analysis of this issue, see A. DE THEUX, supra note 1, at
333-609.
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ber States will be discussed, considering in addition the latest EEC
Draft Directive on the harmonization of the law relating to Commer-
cial Agents.3 The EEC Commission, in preparing this draft, relied
heavily upon the present German law on Commercial Agents.
GERMANY24
Agency
Germany enacted the first specific legislation protecting commer-
cial agents in 1897.25 This legislation underwent several changes over
the years26 reaching its present form in August, 1953.27
Under German law, the main grounds for terminating an agency
contract are: mutual agreement of principal and agent; expiration of
the contract's term; death of the agent; bankruptcy of the agent; notice;
or an urgent reason. An agency contract entered into for a definite
period of time terminatei upon the expiration of its term.28 If, how-
ever, the agent continues the relationship after the initially agreed upon
period, and the principal is aware of this and does not immediately
object to it, then the agency contract will be deemed prolonged.29
Moreover from that point on, the agency contract will be deemed a
contract of unlimited duration.30
The change of qualification from a contract for a definite period of
time to a contract of indefinite duration, is of crucial importance for the
applicability of the provisions of the HGB on commercial agents. Sev-
23 Proposal of Dec. 17, 1976 for a Council Directive to coordinate the laws of the Member
States relating to Commercial Agents, 20 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. C 13) 2 (1977), as amended Jan.
19, 1979, 22 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. C 56) 5 (1979). See text accompanying notes 255-300 infra.
24 For more details, see Cohn, An Introduction to the German Law on Agents and Sale
Distributors, COMMERCIAL AGENCY AND DISTRIBUTION AGREEMENTS IN EUROPE 1-23 (London,
1964); H. EBERSTEIN, DER HANDELSVERTRETER VERTRAG (Heidelberg, 1978); M.
SCHLEGELBERGER, HANDELSGESETZBUCH 626-900 (Milnchen, 5th ed. 1973); H. SCHROEDER,
RECHT DER HANDELSVERTRETER (1973); W. KUESTNER, DER AUSGLEICHSANSPRUCH DES
HANDELSVERTRETERS (Heidelberg, 1979); F. STAUBACH, THE GERMAN LAW OF AGENCY AND
DiSTRmuTroRsm AGREEMENTS (London, 1976); H. STUMPF, DER VERTRAGSHXNDLERSVERTRAG
(Heidelberg, 1979).
25 HGB of May 10, 1897, efective Jan. 1, 1900. See A. DE THEUX, supra note 1, at 56.
26 For an overview of these changes, see A. DE THEUX, supra note 1, at 56-62.
27 Gesetz zur Anderung des HGB, Bundesgesetzblatt [BGB1] at 771 (1953). It is contained in
articles 84-92(c) of the Handelsgesetzbuch [HGB] (German Commercial Code). In addition, the
more general provisions of articles 164-181, 611-630, and 662-76 of the Burgerliches Gesetzbuch
[BGB] (German Civil Code) dealing with, respectively, agency, contracts for services, and man-
date, are applicable.
28 BGB § 620 11 (W. Ger.).
29 BGB § 625'(W. Ger.).
30 Id.
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eral of the HGB provisions are only applicable to contracts of indefi-
nite duration.31 Hence, as the HGB provisions are very favorable for
agents, a tacit prolongation of an agency contract initially concluded
for a limited duration, is very beneficial for the agent involved. The
principal would, however, be able to avoid this change of qualification
and yet in practical terms reach the same result, by inserting a so-called
renewal clause in the agreement. Such clauses typically call for a pro-
longation of the agreement for a fixed number of years, unless either
principal or agent has given notice three to six months before the date
of expiration. The number of possible prolongations is usually
unlimited.
Renewal clauses have been frequently inserted in agency contracts
of limited duration, however the German Legislature has remained si-
lent on the issue of the nature of these agency contracts after the first
prolongation. Thus, parties have on several occasions turned to the
courts to determine whether their agreement remained an agreement of
limited duration notwithstanding the prolongation.3"
The Landesgericht in Dortmund answered this question nega-
tively.33 The facts underlying the case were as follows: an agency con-
tract was signed to be executed from June 13, 1969 through June 12,
1971. The parties agreed that the contract would be renewed for an
unlimited additional amount of two-year periods unless either princi-
pal or agent gave notice six months prior to the date of expiration. No-
tice of termination was given by the principal on December 11, 1972.
The agent claimed the notice was void because the notice was not given
by the end of a quarter year as prescribed by Section 89 HGB for
agency contracts of unlimited duration.34 The Landesgericht of Dort-
mund followed the agent's reasoning. The Court pointed out that the
renewal clause and the use that has been made of it, rendered the true
length of the agency contract highly uncertain since a positive action,
namely the giving of notice, was required to terminate the contract.
Since no one could predict if and when parties would give notice to one
another, from the first renewal on, the contract was a contract of unlim-
ited duration.
In 1974, however, the Federal Supreme Court reversed the deci-
31 See, e.g., the text of article 89 of the HGB which explicitly refers to contracts of indefinite
duration.
32 See, e.g., Judgment of Sept. 17, 1973, 1973 DER BETRiEBs BERATER 1504; Judgment of
Sept. 10, 1973, 1973 DER BETRIEBS BERATER 1233; Judgment of Dec. 12, 1974, 1975 DER BE-
TRIEBS BERATER 194.
33 Judgment of Sept. 17, 1973, 1973 DER BETRIEBS BERATER 1504.
34 See text accompanying notes 42-47 infra.
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sion of the Landesgericht of Dortmund." In a very cryptic decision,
the Court pointed out that the parties had agreed on "a way to organise
the duration of the contract" and, hence, the contract remained a con-
tract of limited duration, notwithstanding one or more prolongations.
The decision of the Federal Supreme Court has been severely criticized
by German scholars36 for its definition of the "definite duration" con-
cept. The rationale of the Court has been questioned, with at least one
scholar suggesting that the decision may not hold up for very long.3 7
The death of an agent forms a second ground for termination of
the agency contract. 38 The principal's death, on the other hand, has no
impact on the agency contract, unless the parties have agreed
otherwise.39
Section 23 of the Federal Bankruptcy Act4 ° stipulates that agency
contracts terminate upon the principal's bankruptcy. Note that the
agency contract in theory remains in effect when the agent goes bank-
rupt. This may, however, justify the immediate termination of the
agreement by the principal.41
Agency contracts concluded for an indefinite period of time may at
all times be terminated by either principal or agent on the condition
that the statutory or contractual notice period be respected.42 The
Commercial Code contains notice periods which will automatically ap-
ply unless other notice periods have been provided for contractually.43
An agency contract may be dissolved during the first three years by a
six week notice period, which must be given by the end of a quarter
year.44 Parties may agree on a shorter notice period. A one month
notice period, however, is the strict minimum. In such a case, notice
may only be given by the end of the month.45 After three years, an
agency contract may only be dissolved upon a six-month notice period
to be given by the end of a quarter year. Parties cannot deviate from
this rule.46 The notice period to be observed by principal and agent
35 Judgment of Dec. 12, 1974, 1975 DER BETRiFBs BERATER 194.
36 See, ag., Kuestner, Case Comment, 1975 DER BETRIEBS BERATER 195, 196, who speaks of
"an astonishing judgment"; see also H. EBERSTEIN, supra note 24, at 66.
37 H. EBERSTEIN, supra note 24, at 66.
38 BGB arts. 673, 675 (W. Ger.).
39 BGB arts. 672, 675 (W. Ger.).
40 KONKURSORDNUNG [KO] art. 23 § 2 (W. Ger.).
41 H. EBERSTEIN, supra note 24, at 71.
42 HGB art. 89 (W. Ger.).
43 Id.
44 HGB art. 89 § I (W. Ger.).
45 HGB art. 89 § 2 (W. Ger.).
46 HGB art. 89 § 1 (W. Ger.).
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should be equal; in case of inequality, the longer notice period will
prevail.47
Agency contracts of both definite48 and indefinite duration may be
terminated by either the principal or the agent for "urgent reasons. 49
No notice is then required. The HGB does not define the term "urgent
reasons." However in 1955 the Bundesarbeitsgericht ° stated that:
an urgent reason for termination of an agency contract exists if, based on
all aspects of a particular case, one party can not possibly be required to
continue its relationship with the other party, not even during the notice
period. A fault of the terminated party is thereto not required.
The Bundesarbeitsgericht's definition has been applied over the
years in a great number of cases by several legal scholars. 1 Examples
of agent's activities allowing the principal to immediately terminate the
agreement include: (1) attempts to induce a fellow agent, working for
the same principal, to leave his present job and start work for another
principal.52 The latter does not necessarily have to be a competitor of
his predecessor;53 (2) constant and gross negligence in the commerciali-
zation of the principal's product;54 (3) unauthorized sale of competing
brands;55 and (4) noncompliance with the principal's instructions,56 e.g.
on advertising.
A particularly troublesome problem is whether the mere fact of
poor sales performances by the agent justifies termination of the agency
agreement without notice. The question has as yet not been answered
by the Bundesgerichtshof, however, several Oberlandesgerichten an-
swered it negatively. Unless the principal can point to a specific breach
on the agent's part, poor performance in itself would not constitute an
urgent reason to terminate the agreement.5 7
The terminated party, whether principal or agent, has a right to
claim damages for all losses suffered as a result of the abrupt and un-
planned termination of the contract unless the termination of the
47 HGB art. 89 § 3 (W. Ger.).
48 The text of HGB art. 89a relating to immediate termination for urgent reasons makes no
distinction between agency contracts of limited and unlimited duration.
49 HGB art. 89a (V. Ger.).
50 Judgment of Nov. 3, 1955, A.R. Blattei, Kundigung IX, Entech. 7/8.
51 See, e.g., M. SCHLEGELBERGER, supra note 24, at 665; H. EBERSTEIN, supra note 24, at 68.
52 Judgment of Mar. 11, 1977, 1977 DER BETRIEBs BERATER 1170.
53 Id.
54 Judgment of Feb. 28, 1963, 1963 DER BETRIEBS BERATER 447.
55 Judgment of Dec. 13, 1962, 1963 DER BETREBs BERATER 203; Judgment of Feb. 23, 1972,
1972 DER BETRIEBS BERATER 467.
56 Judgment of June 9, 1960, 1960 DER BETRiEBS BERATER 956.
57 Judgment of Dec. 2, 1970, 1971 DER BETRIEBS BERATER 572; Judgment of Feb. 28, 1963,
1963 DEt BETRIEBs BERATER 447.
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agency contract was caused by the terminated party's own behavior.58
Moreover, the agent is entitled to claim a specific compensation for the
loss of goodwill.59 The purpose of this claim is to compensate the agent
for the benefit which accrues to the principal from the agent's labor
and, furthermore, the benefit that will continue to accrue from the
goodwill established by the agent as long as the principal remains in
business.6 0 An agent is entitled to compensation for the loss of good-
will pursuant to Section 89b HGB if the agent can establish the follow-
ing three conditions: (1) the principal derived considerable benefits
from the contacts which the agent has established with new clients;
(2) the agent has lost or will lose commissions due to the termination of
the agency contract; and (3) the payment of compensation is just and
fair. Compensation is limited to the amount of one year's gross com-
missions, calculated at an average of the commissions of the last five
years, or, if the contractual relationship was shorter, the period of
agency.
61
The agent's right to initiate a claim cannot be contracted out in
advance.62 The claim, however, must be initiated within three months
from the termination of the agency contract. The claim will not be
successful if the agent has been dismissed for an "urgent reason."63
Similarly, an agent will not be entitled to compensation if the agent has
terminated the contract, unless the principal's behavior has forced him
to do so' or the termination was caused by the agent's age or illness. 5
Distributorshp
In Germany, there are presently no specific legislative provisions
governing distributorship agreements.6 6 The Bundesgerichtshof has
characterized these agreements as suigeneris, i e., not classifiable within
58 HGB art. 89a § 2 (W. Ger.).
59 The so-called "Ausgleichanspruch," HGB art. 89b (W. Ger.).
60 For an overview of the latest case law on this subject, see Laum, DerAusgleichansyruch des
Handelsvertrefers in der Rechtsprechung des Bundesgerichtshofes, 1967 DER BETRIEBs BERATER
1359; Kuestner, Neue Rechtsprechung sum Ausgleichanspruch des Handelsvertreters nach § 89b
HGB, 1972 DEn BErIEus BERATER 1300-06. For a detailed analysis on the calculation methods
used, see Hohn, Winrschafiliche Anspruchfaktoren beim Ausscheiden des Handelsvertreters, 1972
DER BETRIEBS BERATER 521-25.
61 HGB art. 89b (2) (W. Ger.).
62 Id.
63 HGB art. 89b (3) (W. Ger.).
64 Id.
65 The latter exception was expressly added to the law in 1976. See Kuestner, Neufassung des
89b Abs. 31HGB beialters--oder Krankheitsbedingter Handelsvertreters, 1976 DER BETRIEBS BER-
ATER 630-33.
66 F. STAUBACH, supra note 24, at 230.
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existing categories.67 An important question which German courts, in-
cluding the Federal Supreme Court have dealt with in this area, is
whether Sections 89, 89a and 89b HGB, relating to the termination of
agency contracts, apply by analogy to distributorship agreements. In
other words, are distributors entitled to a notice period and goodwill
indemnification in the same manner and under the same conditions as
agents?
The Bundesgerichtshof answered this question positively with re-
spect to exclusive distributors. In a leading decision of April 5, 196268
the Court held:
As already stated many times by the courts, the legal relationship between
a manufacturer and a distributor who are exclusively bound to each other
by the manufacturer's distribution network gives rise to an association of
interests which is usually intended to last for a long period. This relation-
ship is in many respects similar to that between a manufacturer and a
commercial representative. It is therefore right to apply to such a distrib-
utor those provisions of the law governing commercial representatives
which are justified by the basis and purpose of the provisions. . .. It
must therefore be presumed that the defendant (manufacturer) could only
terminate the contract between the parties by giving six weeks' statutory
notice to expire at the end of a quarter.6 9
Hence, under German law an exclusive distributorship agreement can
only be terminated in compliance with the statutory notice periods for
agents unless the manufacturer can justify a reason for termination
without notice as provided for in Section 89b HGB. This decision has
been approved by leading German scholars. They, however, empha-
size that the application by analogy is only then accepted if justified on
the basis and the purpose of the Commercial Code provisions.70 At
least one author maintains that this application by analogy can only
take place if parties to a distributorship agreement have not stipulated
to a longer or shorter notice period in the agreement. 71 The distributor
is in less need of protection than the agent and therefore it would be
unnecessary to apply the notice provisions for agents if parties have
agreed or otherwise provided in the agreement.72
An equally important question German courts have dealt with is
whether distributors are entitled to compensation for their goodwill in
67 Judgment of Dec. 11, 1958, 1959 DER BETRiEBS BERATER 7; see also F. STAUBACH, supra
note 24, at 230.
68 Judgment of Apr. 5, 1962, 1962 DER BETRIEBS BERATER 543.
69 Id.
70 See H. STUMPF, supra note 24, at 26.
71 Id. at 106.
72 Id.
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the same way as agents.73 The Bundesgerichtshof answered this ques-
tion in several cases74 with the result demonstrating an interesting
evolution in the Court's reasoning. In the earliest Supreme Court case
on this issue,75 a manufacturer of branded products entered into a dis-
tributorship agreement with a local distributor. The latter was granted
the exclusive right to sell the manufacturer's products in a designated
area. The distributorship agreement required the distributor to pro-
mote the manufacturer's interests and agree to the following terms:
maintain a minimum annual sales figure; abide by the resale prices
fixed by the manufacturer; follow the manufacturer's instructions re-
garding advertisements; notify the manufacturer of every sale made;
and give the manufacturer, after termination of the distributorship
agreement, all invoices, business papers and addresses of customers.
The manufacturer terminated this agreement and chose another dis-
tributor for the area. The terminated distributor claimed compensation
on the basis of Section 89b HGB.
The Bundesgerichtshof granted the distributor compensation. The
court held that a distributor is entitled to goodwill compensation if the
relationship between the distributor and the manufacturer encompasses
more than a simple seller-buyer relationship. According to the Court,
this will generally be the case with an agreement between a manufac-
turer of branded products and an exclusive distributor within a specific
territory. In light of the many requirements placed upon the distribu-
tor under a typical distributorship agreement for branded products, a
distributor can hardly be characterized as an ordinary buyer of the
manufacturer's products. On the contrary, the distributor is part of the
manufacturer's sales organization performing tasks which are normally
performed by an agent. For example, a distributor's duties under a
typical distributorship agreement are identical to the duties the Legisla-
ture has stipulated for agents, such as notification of sales, closely fol-
lowing manufacturer's directives, price fixing, etc. Thus, the
Bundesgerichtshof felt it only natural to apply to distributors by anal-
ogy the indemnity provisions of the Commercial Code relating to
agents.
The Court, in early decisions was willing to grant a goodwill com-
pensation to a distributor if the latter was in need of protection because
73 HGB art. 89(b) (W. Ger.).
74 Judgment of Feb. 11, 1977, 1977 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFr 896; Judgment of
Dec. 19, 1966, 1967 DER BETRiEBs BERATER 95; Judgment of Apr. 5, 1962, 1962 DER BETRIEBS
BERATER 542; Judgment of Dec. 11, 1958, 1959 DER BETRiEBs BERATER 7.
75 Judgment of Dec. 11, 1958, 1959 DER BErTiEas BERATER 7.
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of his weaker position vis-a-vis the manufacturer. But, the distributor
was only entitled to a goodwill compensation if he could show that he
was completely dependent upon the principal, similar to a typical com-
mercial agent. The Bundesgerichtshof changed its position on this is-
sue by overruling a court of appeals case in which goodwill
compensation to a terminated distributor of branded products was de-
nied on the ground that the latter had partly run his business with his
own capital and was, hence, in no real need of protection upon termi-
nation of the agreement, since his invested capital had grown with the
business.76 The Court, in overruling the appellate decision, held that
the distributor's need for protection is irrelevant to his right to goodwill
compensation.77 This right exists from the moment the relationship be-
tween manufacturer and distributor becomes more than a seller-buyer
relationship and the distributor is contractually obligated to perform
tasks and live up to standards normally applicable to agents. However,
under German law, goodwill compensation can be explicitly contracted





French legislative bodies, as in Germany, have provided specific
protective measures for agents80 but have remained completely silent
regarding distributors. There is as yet no French domestic statute di-
rectly regulating distributorship agreements.8 ' Similar to Germany,
the task of devising solutions to meet the exigencies of disputes result-
76 The Court of Appeals reached this conclusion because, inter alia, the distributor granted the
customers longer terms of payment than he himself obtained from the manufacturer. It should be
added that upon termination of the agreement the distributor had to transfer all his clients to the
manufacturer.
77 Judgment of Feb. 11, 1977, 1977 NEUE JURISTICHE WOCHENSCHRIFr 896.
78 HGB art. 92(c) (W. Ger.).
79 For a general overview, see FRENCH LAW OF AGENCY, note 6 supra; Guyenot, Concession
Exclusive, ENCYCLOPADIE DALLOZ (1980); P. DIDIER, DROIT COMMERCIALE (1970); Serna, Agent
Commercial, Encyclopbdie Dalloz (1980); Carbonneau, note 6 supra; A. ROLLAND, LA SITUATION
JURIDIQUE DES CONCESSIONNAIRES ET DES FRANCHISEES MEMBRES D'UN RIsEAU COMMERCIAL
(Paris, 1976); Buhagiar, Dolt-on crker un Statut lgal des Concessionnaires de Vente Exclusive,
[1975] JURISCLASSEUR PARIODIQUE, id. C.I. 11659; Buhagiar, £'avenir des Contrats de Concessions
de Vente Exclusive, [1976] JURISCLASSEUR PISRIODIQUE, id. C.I. 12138; Guyenot, Lumixtion des
ARgles du Droit du Travail dons les Rapports entre Conczants et Concessionnaires, [1976] 1
GAZETrE DU PALAis, DOCTRINE 457; Threard, Le Statut "egal du Concessionnaire, [1977] 2
JURISCLASSEUR PARIODIQUE, 6d. C.I. 12536.
80 CODE CIVIL [C. ciV.] arts. 1984-2010 (Fr.).
81 Carbonneau, supra note 6, at 91.
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ing from distributorship contracts has been placed upon the courts.82
The French courts, however, refuse to apply to distributors by analogy
the statutory provisions for agents. They instead confine themselves to
applying traditional principles of contract law.83
Agency
The rights and duties of agents and principals under French law
are set forth in Articles 1984-2010 of the French Civil Code and in
Decree n' 58-1345 of December 23, 1958.14 There are basically five
reasons for terminating agency contracts: expiration of the term of the
contract; the death of the principal or agent; deprivation of civil rights;
insolvency or bankruptcy;8 5 or urgent reasons.8 6
Agency contracts entered into for a limited period of time nor-
mally terminate upon the expiration of their term. The agent is not
entitled to claim indemnification from the principal if the latter decides
not to renew the contract.8 7 If after the expiration of the term the par-
ties continue their commercial relationship, the French courts presume
that the parties have tacitly renewed their old agreement under the
same terms, except for the duration clause. The new agreement, there-
fore, is an agreement of unlimited duration. 8
Parties can avoid this automatic change of character of their agree-
ment by inserting in the original agreement a tacit renewal clause of
limited duration. This was decided by the Cour de Cassation in the
Brocvielle v. Soc. Francio Hoval case. 9 In that case, the parties had
signed an agency contract on April 7, 1966 for a two year period. At
the end of that period the contract was to be automatically prolonged
for another two years unless one of the parties expressed a wish to ter-
minate the agreement at least six months before the term of the con-
tract. The tacit prolongation could take place as many times as the
parties wanted, but the term was limited to consecutive two-year peri-
ods, thus leaving parties free to terminate the contract every two years.
82 Id. at 92.
83 Id.; FRENCH LAW OF AGENCY, supra note 6, at 237.
84 Decree no 58-1345 du 23 d6cembre 1958 relatif aux agents commerciaux, 1958 Journal Of-
fiiel de la Republique Franqaise [J.O.] 11947.
85 C. cIv. art. 2003 (Fr.).
86 Decree no 58-1345, 1958 J.O. 11947, art. 3 § 2.
87 Judgment of May 22, 1964, Cour d'appel, Paris, [1964] 2 Gazette du Palais 230; Judgment
of Oct. 15, 1973, Cour de Cassation [Cass. civ. com.], 1973 Bulletin Civil IV [Bull. Civ. IV] , no.
277.
88 Judgment of Feb. 16, 1970, Cass. civ. corn., 1970 Receuil Dalloz-Sirey Sommaires [D.S.
Som.] 135.
89 Judgment of Apr. 24, 1974, Cass. civ. com., 1975 D.S. Som. 764.
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The Cour d'appel de Rouen 90 held that despite automatic prolon-
gation clauses, agency contracts are considered contracts of limited du-
ration. This decision was affirmed by the Cour de Cassation in a
cryptic and rather poorly reasoned decision. 91 These decisions met
with severe criticism because of their definition of the "definite dura-
tion" concept. French legal scholars emphasize that a contract can
only be of limited duration if its termination is caused by a future and
objective event that takes place without any intervention by one of the
parties. A contract of unlimited duration, on the other hand, termi-
nates only upon a unilateral decision of one of the parties.92 This test
was clearly not followed by the Cour de Cassation in the Brocvielle
case.93 In contracts with automatic prolongation clauses, intervention
by at least one of the parties is necessary to terminate the agreement.
Agency contracts, whether of definite or indefinite duration, may
be terminated anytime by the principal. This rule is laid down in Arti-
cle 2003 of the Code Civil and is not affected by the Decree of 1958.94
However, a leading French author noted that this rule "loses a great
deal of its value as a result of the principal's correlated obligation to
pay compensation to the agent."95 Article 3 of the Decree of 1958 in-
deed provides that unilateral termination of the agency agreement by
the principal, unless justified by a fault of the agent, entitles the agent
to compensation for the loss he suffered, notwithstanding any contrary
agreement.9
6
Two conditions must be fulfilled before a terminated agent may
claim indemnity from the principal. These conditions are: (1) an effec-
tive and unilateral termination of the agreement by the principal and
(2) a total absence of fault by the agent justifying the principal to termi-
nate the agreement. If these two conditions are met, the terminated
agent is entitled to claim "compensation for the loss he has suffered" as
a result of the principal's termination of the agreement. 97
With respect to the first condition, as mentioned earlier,98 the mere
non-renewal of an agency contract of limited duration does not entitle
90 Judgment of Nov. 10, 1972, Cour d'appel, Rouen, unpublished.
91 Judgment of Apr. 24, 1974, Cass. civ. com., 1975 Receuil Dalloz-Sirey, Jurisprudence [D.S.
Jur.] 764.
92 See, e.g., Delaporte, Case Comment, 1975 D.S. Jur. 765, 766; G. PUOLAIN, LA DISTINCTION
DES CONTRATS A DURLE DATERMINAE ET INDATERMINtE, no. 25 (Paris, 1971).
93 Judgment of Apr. 24, 1974, Cass. civ. com., 1975 D.S. Jur. 764.
94 Serna, supra note 79, at n. 11.
95 See FRENCH LAW OF AGENCY, .supra note 6, at 67.
96 1958 J.O. 11947, art. 3.
97 Id. at art. 3, § 2.
98 See text accompanying notes 87-88 supra.
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the agent to claim an indemnity. The agreement terminates by expira-
tion and not by an act of the principal.9 9 This is not true, however, if
the principal previously promised a renewal of the agreement, yet de-
cides not to keep his promise. This amounts to a unilateral termination
by the principal.1 "0
The second condition for an agent's claim for indemnity is the ab-
sence of fault on the part of the agent which would justify termination
of the agreement by the principal."0 ' The law does not specify the re-
quired degree of misconduct which would justify a termination without
compensation. The Cour d'appel de Paris has held that the following
events do justify termination without compensation: an agent offering
competing brands to the principal's customers; 0 2 an agent knowingly
canvassing in territory allocated to other agents;103 or an agent damag-
ing the principal's reputation by making malicious remarks concerning
the principal beyond reasonable criticism."
Similar to German laws, the mere fact that lower sales figures were
realized in comparison with previous years, would not justify the im-
mediate termination of the agency contract, provided the realized
figures are not "ridiculously low."' 05 It is uncertain whether shortcom-
ings on the agent's part due to illness, fatigue or even old age would
justify termination of the agency contract. 10 6
Since the Decree of 1958107 the burden of proof in this area lies on
the principal; he has to prove the agent's misconduct.'08 Prior to the
Decree of 1958, the agent had to demonstrate that the termination was
improper. The agent's position under the present law is thus considera-
bly more comfortable. A leading French author on this subject 09 clas-
sifies an agent's possible claims in the following catch-all formula:
(1) a claim for the loss of the immatriculation card;' 10 (2) a claim for
material, commercial and moral losses; and (3) an additional claim in
99 See FRENCH LAW OF AGENCY, supra note 6, at 67.
100 Id. at 68.
101 Decree n* 58-1345, art. 3 § 2, 1958 J.O. 11947.
102 Judgment of Mar. 7, 1964, Cour d'appel, Paris, [1964] 2 Gazette du Palais 131.
103 Judgment of Oct. 23, 1964, Cour d'appel, Paris, 1965 D.S. Som. 36.
104 Id.
105 Judgment of Jan. 30, 1965, Cour d'appel, Paris, 1965 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT
COMMERCIAL 925.
106 See FRENCH LAW OF AGENCY, supra note 6, at 69.
107 1958 J.O. 11947.
108 See FRENCH LAW OF AGENCY, supra note 6, at 70.
109 See Serna, supra note 79, at n.137.
110 In France admission to the profession of commercial agent is subject to registration in a
special register kept at the Commercial Court. The registration is valid for 5 years but renewal is
possible. If the agent ceases his practice or if he no longer satisfies the conditions for being a
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case of abusive termination, (e.g., an abrupt termination after many
years of commercial relationship whereby the agent could not have
foreseen this termination). This classification unfortunately does not
shed much light on the problem.
Whatever the legal qualification of the elements of the statutory
indemnification may be, courts tend to fix the amount of compensation
at twice the average commission the agent earned under the agency
agreement during the preceding three years."' Depending upon the
circumstances of each case, other elements may be added to this
amount. In particular, an extra indemnity may be added to remedy an
abusive or unexpected termination. 112 Furthermore, the Decree n' 58-
1345 does not provide a specific compensation for the loss of goodwill.
This claim should, therefore, be incorporated in the general indemnity
claim which covers, as mentioned, several types of prejudice.
Distributorship Agreements
As previously mentioned, "13 France does not have a domestic stat-
ute regulating distributorship agreements. Several attempts to enact
such legislation have been made, but none have been successful. In
light of the complete lack of statutory protection, the distributors in
France have requested courts to give them a right to a reasonable no-
tice period and compensation for losses suffered upon termination of
the distributorship agreement similar to agents. French courts have
been until recently more reluctant than German courts to honor this
request.' 15 The most recent case law on the issue shows an evolution in
favour of the distributor."1
6
French courts, in the absence of legislation authorizing them to
apply by analogy the articles of the Code Civil and the Decree of 1958
on commercial agents to distributors, abide by the rule that distributor-
ship agreements are governed by general rules of contract law.' 17 The
registered commercial agent, he must cancel his registration. See FRENCH LAW OF AGENCY,
supra note 6, at 73-84.
111 See Serna, supra note 79, at n.137.
112 See, e.g., Judgment of Nov. 6, 1975, Cour d'appel, Paris, 1976 D.S. Jur. 344; Judgment of
May 2, 1975, Cour d'appel, Aix en provence, 1976 D.S. Jur. 344; Judgment of Apr. 20, 1972, Cour
d'appel, Paris, 1973 D.S. Som. 105; Judgment of Jan. 3, 1973, Tribunal de Commerce, Paris, 1973
D.S. Som. 137.
113 See note 6 and accompanying text supra.
114 Id.
115 See Carbonneau, supra note 6, at 92 and 110.
116 See text accompanying notes 124-137 ifra.
117 See FRENCH LAW OF AGENCY, supra note 6, at 237; Carbonneau, supra note 6, at 92 and
110.
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distributor is an independent merchant and therefore free to negotiate
the terms of the distributorship agreement. Under basic contract
law,118 a distributor is bound by the negotiated terms and cannot claim
entitlement to a notice period or goodwill indemnification if such
things are not provided in the contract. The only escape for the distrib-
utor is to demonstrate that the manufacturer either breached the con-
tract, in which case he would be liable to the agent for all losses caused
by this breach, or that the manufacturer's refusal to renew the contract
or his decision to unilaterally terminate the contract, constitutes an
abuse of rights.1 9 However the latter will not be the case if the possi-
bility of non-renewal or unilateral termination is negotiated in the
agreement.
The French courts have strictly applied this rule,120 first utilized in
the leading case of Soc. Therdynelec v. Soc. General Motors.12 1 In that
case, the plaintiff was a distributor in the defendant's distribution net-
work for four years. Their commercial relationship had been estab-
lished by a series of annual contracts which were not tacitly renewable,
beginning in 1949 and ending in 1952. On December 30, 1952, the de-
fendant notified the plaintiff that he would not renew the contract for
1953. The plaintiff sued the defendant for damages on two grounds.
First, the plaintiff claimed that in 1952 the defendant had given him
implicit but unequivocal assurances that the contract would be renewed
for another year. Secondly, in view of the length of their dealings, the
defendant's abrupt termination of their dealings constituted an abuse
of right.
The Cour d'appel de Paris122 rejected the plaintiffs claim. The
court emphasized that the terms of the agreement may result in hard-
ship on one of the parties, but these terms constituted a valid agreement
entered into by two independent merchants. The plaintiff was perfectly
aware of the non-renewal clause in the agreement and the risks he was
incurring under the agreement. The defendant's non-renewal of the
contract was therefore not an abuse of right, but merely an exercise of a
contractual right. This decision was upheld by the Cour de Cassa-
118 C. cm. art. 1134 (Fr.). This article reads as follows: "The terms of an agreement have force
of law for the parties."
119 See FRENCH LAW OF AGENCY, supra note 6, at 241; Guyenot, Concession Exclusive, 1980
ENCYCLOPfDiE DALLOZ, an. 182-213, with references to case law.
120 Guyenot, supra note 119 at -m.182-213.
121 Judgment of June 28, 1958, Cour d'appel, Paris, [1958] 2 Gazette du Palais, Jurisprudence
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tion.' 23 The courts thus applied the maxim dura lex said lex and con-
tinued to apply it for a number of years.
Courts over the years 124 came to appreciate the disastrous effects
on the distributor's business of unjustified and abrupt termination of an
exclusive distributorship agreement by the principal.125 The Courts
were caught between their desire to help the distributor and their duty
to apply Article 1134 of the Code Civil which stipulates that parties to a
valid contract are bound by its terms.12 6
Several solutions have been tried but so far none of them seems
widely accepted by either courts or legal scholars. Some courts 127 have
continued to apply the abuse of right doctrine; however they have
shown themselves less demanding than the Cour de Cassation in the
Therdynelec case. These courts more easily accept the existence of an
abuse of right on the manufacturer's part. Other courts12 8 have tried
mitigating the present hardships for distributors, by applying the theory
of the "mandate of common interest"' 29 to distributorship agreements.
The notion of "mandate of common interest" was developed several
years ago by French courts in order to provide a means for them to
deviate from the rules normally applied upon termination of an agency
contract. 30 Unlike a normal mandate, a "mandate of common interest
can only be revoked by mutual consent of the parties or for an urgent
reason.""' The Cour d'appel d'Amiens applied the theory of "man-
date of common interest" in the case of S.A. Application des Gaz v. Soc.
123 Id.
124 With the exception, however, of the Cour de Cassation, which up to this date regularly
refuses to qualify a termination as abusive. See, e.g., Judgment of Feb. 20, 1979, Cass. civ. com.,
1979 Recueil Dalloz-Sirey, Informations rapides 316, in which the Court held that termination of
a distributorship agreement of unlimited duration, several months after the manufacturer had
informed the distributor of his disappointment of the sales figures reached and offering the distrib-
utor to continue to be the importer of his products, does not constitute an abuse of right. See also
Judgment of May 3, 1979, Cass. civ. com., 1979 D.S. Jur. 364, in which the Court held that the
termination of a distributorship agreement does not constitute an abuse of right where the term of
the agreement was for one year, nonrenewable, and the manufacturer terminated three days after
the expiration of the term.
125 See note I 1 supra.
126 See note 118 supra.
127 See, e.g., Judgment of May 23, 1977, Cour d'appel, Limoges, [1978] 2 CAHIER DE DROIT DE
L'ENTREPRISE 15; Judgment of Oct. 9, 1963, Cour d'appel, Paris, 1963 Juris classeur PF6riodique,
id. C.I. 72907.
128 See, e.g., Judgment of Dec. 13, 1973, Cour d'appel, d'Amiens, 1975 D.S. Jur. 452; Judgment
of Jan. 29, 1964, Cour d'appel, Lyon, 1965 D.S. Jur. 185.
129 For more details on this notion, see FRENCH LAW OF AGENCY, supra note 6, at 9-16. See
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des Etabl. Debrie.132 In this case, the defendant was the exclusive dis-
tributor for plaintiff's branded products for over eighteen years. De-
fendant was fully integrated in the plaintiff's distribution network and
strictly controlled by him. Defendant could not sell other products,
and was required to follow plaintiff's instructions regarding the quanti-
ty and price at which the product could be sold. The distributorship
agreement had been entered into for an indefinite duration. Plaintiff
terminated this agreement, by registered letter of November 5, 1971, to
take effect on January 1, 1972. Plaintiff had never before showed any
dissatisfaction with the defendant's work. Instead, he claimed that a
reorganization of his distribution network forced him to terminate de-
fendant's agreement.
The defendant, distributor and original plaintiff sued the principal,
for damages. The Tribunal de Commerce de Beauvais' 33 honored the
claim on the ground that principal and distributor were bound by a
"mandate of common interest" which the manufacturer could not ter-
minate without just cause. On appeal, the Cour d'appel d'Amiens af-
firmed the decision, thereby explicitly adopting the lower court's
reasoning.13 The decision was confirmed by the Cour de Cassation 35
which, however, based its confirmation on the notion of abuse of rights
and rejected the Cour d'appel's recourse to the "mandate of common
interest." The Cour de Cassation ruled that the termination was abu-
sive in light of the longstanding commercial dealings between the par-
ties and the short notice period. The distributor would have an
extremely hard time finding a suitable replacement for the terminated
agreement and, furthermore, the distributor could not survive on his
own since his customers were attached to the brand name he repre-
sented rather than to the distributor's personal skills. Hence, he was
entitled to damages. Thus, the Cour de Cassation explicitly rejected
the theory of "mandate of common interest" as a legal basis for a dis-
tributor's damage claim and reaffirmed the applicability of the abuse of
right doctrine.
The constant recourse to the theory of abuse of right as the sole
legal remedy for a distributor is criticized by several legal scholars who
claim that a liberal application of this principle boils down in practical
terms to an abolition of the manufacturer's contractual right to termi-
132 Judgment of Dec. 13, 1973, Cour d'appel, d'Amiens, 1975 D.S. Jur. 452.
133 Unpublished decision.
134 Judgment of Dec. 13, 1973, Cour d'appel, d'Amiens, 1975 D.S. Jur. 452.
135 Judgment of Mar. 9, 1976, Cass. civ. com., 1976 D.S. Jur. 338.
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nate or not renew the contract. 36 These scholars would prefer a clear
legislative or judicial recognition of the economic subordination of the
distributor. One way to achieve this goal would be to discard the tradi-
tional notion of the distributor as an independent merchant and adopt
the view that he is an "employed merchant" which would bring him
within the scope of the French labor laws.' 37 However their efforts
have so far remained unanswered by either legislative bodies or courts.
The latter have as yet preferred to stay within the classical concepts of
civil law, primarily the abuse of right doctrine and to a much lesser
extent the "mandate of common interest" doctrine.
BELGIUM
Belgium's position in this survey is unique in two respects: first, it
offers no statutory protection to its agents; second, it is the only Mem-
ber State that has enacted specific legislation for distributors.'38
Distributorsh6913
9
The rights and duties of distributors under Belgian law are gov-
erned by the Statute of July 27, 1961, as amended on April 13, 1971.140
Originally, this Statute covered only exclusive distributorship agree-
ments. However, in 1971, its scope was expanded to include two kinds
of non-exclusive distributorship agreements:"' (1) distributorship
agreements whereby the distributor sells not all but nearly all of the
manufacturer's products in the conceded territory; and (2) distributor-
ship agreements whereby the manufacturer imposes on the distributor
136 See, e.g., Souleau, Case Comment, 1978 D.S. Jur. 693, 696. See also Rolland, Case Com-
ment, 1975 D.S. Jur. 453, 457; FRENcH LAW OF AGENCY, supra note 6, at 236; Carbonneau, supra
note 6, at 95.
137 See FRENCH LAW OF AGENCY, supra note 6, at 255; Carbonneau, supra note 6, at 95 and
Ill.
138 Loi du 27 juillet 1961 relative A la r6siliation unilat6rale des concessions de vente exclusive
A dur6e ind6termin6e, comme modifi6e par la loi du 13 avril 1971 (Law of July 27, 1961 on the
unilateral termination of Indefinite Exclusive Distribution Agreements, as amended by the Law of
Apr. 13, 1971), MONITEUR BELGE Oct. 5, 1961, and MONrEUR BELGE Apr. 21, 1971 (Belg.).
139 The leading Belgian treatise on this issue is G. BRICMONT & J.M. PHILIPS, COMMENTAIRE
DES DISPOSITIONS DE DROIT BELGE ET COMMUNAUTAIRE APPLICABLES AUX CONCESSIONS DE
VENTE EN BELGIQUE (Brussels, 1977). For an overview of recent case law, see Sunt, Overzicht van
de Belangrl'kste Rechtspraak met Betrekking tot de Wet van 270761 Betreffende Eenzy/dige
Beeind'ging van de voor Onbepaalde T2[d Verleende Concessies van Alleenverkoop, zoals Gewi/zgd
door de Wet van 13.04.71, 1981 Jurisprudence Commerciale de Belgique 431.
140 MONITEuR BELGE Oct. 5, 1961, MONrrEuR BELGE Apr. 21, 1971 (Belg.).
141 Law of July 27, 1961, MONITEUR BELGE Oct. 5, 1961, as amended by Law of Apr. 13, 1971,
MONITEUR BELGE Apr. 21, 1971 (Belg.).
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important obligations that are so onerous that termination of the con-
cession would cause the distributor an important loss.
The Statute is highly protective of distributors. For example, un-
like other European countries, under Belgian law, a distributorship
agreement of limited duration does not terminate upon the expiration
of its term. 142 Such distributorship agreement is terminated only if the
party wishing to terminate the agreement sends a registered letter to the
other party notifying him of his desire to terminate. This letter must be
sent at the earliest, six months, and at the latest, three months, before
the initially agreed upon date of expiration of the contract. 143 Absent
such a letter, the agreement will be deemed to have been renewed,
either for an indefinite period of time, or for the period of time stipu-
lated in the renewal clause.'" Furthermore, if the agreement has been
renewed twice, from the third renewal on, the agreement is automati-
cally coverted into an agreement of unlimited duration. This will be
the case even if the original agreement was amended by the parties. 145
Thus, unlike France 146 and Germany, 147 under Belgian law there is no
possibility of escaping the protective measures for distributors by con-
stantly prolonging the original agreement for limited periods of time.
Aside from termination by mutual consent, distributorship agree-
ments concluded for an indefinite period of time may be terminated
unilaterally if one of the parties commits a serious fault. 148 In that case
no notice period is required. 49 Unfortunately the Statute does not
specify what is meant by a "serious fault." According to the Commer-
cial Court of Brussels, a "serious fault" is a fault, the nature and gravity
of which exclude every possibility of carrying on the commercial rela-
tionship. 5 ' This immediately explains why no notice period is re-
quired since a notice period theoretically presupposes further
cooperation between the parties.




146 See text accompanying notes 89-93 supra.
147 See text accompanying notes 32-37 supra.
148 Law of July 27, 1961, MONITEUR BELGE Oct. 5, 1961, as amended by Law of Apr. 13, 1971,
MoNrru BELGE Apr. 21, 1971, art. 2 (Belg.).
149 See Judgment of Mar. 8, 1977, Tribunal de Commerce, Brussels, 1977 Jurisprudence Com-
merciale de Belgique [JCB] 409; Judgment of Oct. 1, 1975, Cour d'appel, Brussels, 1975-76 Recht-
skundig Weekblad [RWI 2150. See also G. BRICMONT & J.M. PHILIPS, supra note 139, at 31.
150 Judgment of May 18, 1978, Tribunal de Commerce, Brussels, 1978 JCB 485. This definition
is identical to the one used under German law, see text accompanying note 50 supra, and the one
incorporated into the Dutch law, see note 247 and accompanying text supra.
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The concept of "serious fault" has produced an abundancy of case
law15' in an attempt to refine this general guideline. It was held, for
example, that the fact that a distributor did not sell a single product
over a one and a half year period and furthermore never offered proof
that he had made serious attempts to create a market for the products,
constituted a "serious fault," thus allowing the manufacturer to imme-
diately terminate the agreement. 152 Other less extreme or self evident
examples of "serious faults," include: a distributor's constant failure to
pay the manufacturer's bills, notwithstanding several promises to that
effect;' 53 a distributor's poor financial situation; failure on the part of a
distributor to publish the company's annual accounts; distributor abuse
regarding the products entrusted to him; and in general negligence by
the distributor in the performance of his duties under the contract.'54
Absent mutual consent or serious faults by one of the parties in the
fulfillment of his obligations, an agreement of unlimited duration can
only be terminated either by giving an appropriate notice term or by
paying an adequate indemnity. 15 5 Notice term or amount of indemnity
can only be agreed upon after notice is given. However, if the parties
cannot reach an agreement, the court will decide on the basis of equity
and, if available, local customs.156 The terminating party has a choice
between a notice period or an indemnity. The Statute does not contain
minimum notice periods. Parties are completely free to negotiate this
issue after termination of the distributorship agreement, but recourse to
the courts is open to the terminated party if the notice period proposed
by the terminating party seems insufficient.' 57 It is dangerous to give
general guidelines as to what notice period would be deemed reason-
able in a given case. The published case law shows little or no logic
and great divergence exists.' 58 The one element courts do agree on is
that the purpose of the notice period is to allow the distributor to find a
similar distributorship agreement as the terminated one. 159 Starting
151 For a recent overview of the published case law, see Sunt, note 139 supra. For an overview
of unpublished case law, see G. BRICMONT & J.M. PHILIPS, supra note 139, at 241-352.
152 Judgment of Oct. 1, 1975, Cour d'appel, Brussels, 1975-76 RW 2150.
153 Judgment of Nov. 26, 1966, 1967 JCB 229; Judgment of Mar. 4, 1965, 1966 JCB 32.
154 Judgment of Apr. 5, 1966, Rechtbank van Koophandel, Leuven, 1969 Belgische Recht-
spraak Handelszaken [BRH] 286.
155 Law of July 27, 1961, MONITEUR BELGE Oct. 5, 1961, as amended by Law of Apr. 13, 1971,
MONITEuR BELGE Apr. 21, 1971, art. 2 (Belg.).
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 See, e.g., G. BKIcMoNT & J.M. PHILIPS, note 139 supra.
159 Judgment of Oct. 1, 1975, Cour d'appel, Brussels, 1975-76 RW 2150; Judgment of Apr. 26,
1969, Cour d'appel, Brussels, 1969 JCB 327; Judgment of June 18, 1965, Cour d'appel, Brussels,
1965 Journal de Tribunaux [JT] 464; Judgment of May 19, 1978, Tribunal de Commerce, Brussels,
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from this general idea, courts usually take into account the following
elements in fixing a reasonable notice period: the duration of the
agreement; 160 the profits realized by the distributor at the time of the
termination; 161 the magnitude of the conceded territory; 162 the difficul-
ties for the distributor to find a suitable replacement for the terminated
agreement;163 the distributor's promotional expenses; 164 the reputation
of the manufacturer's brand; 5 and, the repercussion of the termina-
tion on the distributor's total activity.' 6 6 A survey of the case law 67
indicates that notice periods may range from as little as three months
for a concession that lasted four months and was never successful 168 to
three years for a concession that lasted twenty-two years and was mod-
erately successful with a salesfigure of BF 1.400.000.169
Absent a reasonable notice period, the terminated party is allowed
to claim an equitable indemnity. 170 The purpose of this indemnity is to
compensate the terminated party for the losses suffered because it did
not receive a notice period. 7' Hence, the main element courts take
into account in calculating this indemnity is the amount of profit the
1978 JCB 485; Judgment of Apr. 16, 1976, Tribunal de Commerce, Brussels, 1976 JCB 436; Judg-
ment of Oct. 29, 1965, Tribunal de Commerce, Brussels, 1966 JT 81; Judgment of Oct. 27, 1962,
Tribunal de Commerce, Brussels, 1963 JCB 26.
160 Judgment of June 18, 1965, Cour d'appel, Brussels, 1965 JT 464; Judgment of May 19, 1978,
Tribunal de Commerce, Brussels, 1978 JCB 485; Judgment of June 11, 1974, Tribunal de Com-
merce, Brussels, 1974 JT 641; Judgment of May 28, 1974, Rechtbank van Koophandel, Ghent,
1974 BRH 397; Judgment of June 4, 1971, Tribunal de Commerce, Brussels, 1971 JT 595; Judg-
ment of June 22, 1965, Tribunal de Commerce, Brussels, 1966 JT 44; Judgment of Oct. 27, 1962,
Tribunal de Commerce, Brussels, 1963 JCB 26.
161 Judgment of May 19, 1978, Tribunal de Commerce, Brussels, 1978 JCB 485; Judgment of
May 28, 1974, Rechtbank van Koophandel, Ghent, 1974 BRH 397; Judgment of Mar. 8, 1963,
Tribunal de Commerce, Brussels, 1963 JT 513.
162 Id.
163 Judgment of May 19, 1978, Tribunal de Commerce, Brussels, 1978 JCB 485; Judgment of
June 11, 1974, Tribunal de Commerce, Brussels, 1974 JT 641; Judgment of Jan. 26, 1972, Tribunal
de Commerce, Brussels, 1972 JT 269.
164 Judgment of May 19, 1978, Tribunal de Commerce, Brussels, 1978 JCB 485; Judgment of
Oct. 27, 1962, Tribunal de Commerce, Brussels, 1963 JCB 26.
165 Judgment of May 28, 1974, Rechtbank van Koophandel, Ghent, 1974 BRH 397; Judgment
of Dec. 23, 1964, Rechtbank, Hasselt, 1965-66 RW 635; Judgment of Mar. 8, 1963, Tribunal de
Commerce, Brussels, 1963 JT 513; Judgment of Oct. 27, 1962, Tribunal de Commerce, Brussels,
1963 JCB 26.
166 Id.
167 See G. BRICMONT & J.M. PmLIPs, supra note 139, at 44-47.
168 Judgment of May 3, 1963, Rechtbank van Koophandel, Antwerpen, 1964-65 RW 542.
169 Judgment of June 4, 1971, Tribunal de Commerce, Brussels, 1971 JT 595.
170 Law of July 27, 1961, MONrrEuR BELGE Oct. 5, 1961, as amended by Law of Apr. 13, 1971,
MONrrER BELGE Apr. 21, 1971, art. 2 (Belg.).
171 Judgment of May 3, 1977, Cour d'appel, Mons, 1977 JCB 348; Judgment of June 18, 1965,
Cour d'appel, Brussels, 1965 JT 464; Judgment of May 3, 1963, Rechtbank van Koophandel,
Antwerpen, 1964-65 RW 542.
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distributor could have realized during the notice period. 17 2 If the terri-
tory in which the distributor operated included several countries, then
overall profits should be taken into consideration and not just the prof-
its realized in Belgium.'73 In addition, the courts, when calculating the
amount of indemnity, often consider the overhead expenses attached to
the terminated agreement 7 4 and the nature of the salesfigures the dis-
tributor realized.'75
Article 3 of the Statute176 stipulates that in addition to the notice
period or equitable indemnity, the distributor may be entitled to an
indemnity for: (1) the increase in turnover he realized, to the extent
that this increase benefits the manufacturer after the agreement is ter-
minated; (2) the costs sustained, to the extent that these costs benefit the
manufacturer after termination; and (3) the redundancy payments the
distributor must pay to his personnel resulting from termination of the
agreement. These additional indemnities may be applicable even when
a reasonable notice period has been given.177 Courts very regularly
grant the distributor all three indemnity items, thus illustrating that
Belgian law provides favorable treatment for distributors.
The many mandatory benefits granted to the distributor under
Belgian law inevitably leads one to describe Belgium, in comparison
with other European countries, as "the paradise for distributors." Yet
manufacturers dealing with Belgian distributors should not lose all
hope. For example in S.A. Vandenboseh v. S.A. Hart an Cooley, 178 the
Belgian Cour de Cassation ruled that manufacturers may include an
express resolutive clause in the agreement allowing them under certain
conditions to terminate the agreement with a short notice period and
without paying any indemnities to the distributor.
172 Judgment of June 18, 1968, Cour d'appel, Brussels, [1968] 2 Pasicrisie 264; Judgment of
Apr. 16, 1976, Tribunal de Commerce, Brussels, 1976 JCB 436; Judgment of June 11, 1974, Tribu-
nal de Commerce, Brussels, 1974 JT 641; Judgment of Dec. 5, 1966, Tribunal de Commerce,
Brussels, 1966 JCB 327; Judgment of May 3, 1963, Rechtbank van Koophandel, Antwerpen, 1964-
65 RW 542.
173 Judgment of June 11, 1972, Tribunal de Commerce, Brussels, 1974 JT 641.
174 Judgment of June 18, 1968, Cour d'appel, Brussels, [1968] 2 Pasicrisie 264; Judgment of
Apr. 16, 1976, Tribunal de Commerce, Brussels, 1976 JCB 436; Judgment of June 11, 1974, Tribu-
nal de Commerce, Brussels, 1974 JT 641; Judgment of Dec. 5, 1966, Tribunal de Commerce,
Brussels, 1966 JCB 327; Judgment of May 3, 1963, Rechtbank van Koophandel, Antwerpen, 1964-
65 RW 542.
175 Judgment of June 18, 1965, Cour d'appel, Brussels, 1965 JT 464; Judgment of June 28,
1973, Tribunal de Commerce, Verviers, 1973 JCB 421.
176 Law of July 27, 1961, MONITEUR BELGE Oct. 5, 1961, as amended by Law of Apr. 13, 1971,
MONITEUR BELGE Apr. 21, 1971, art. 3 (Belg.).
177 Id.
178 Judgment of Apr. 19, 1979, Cour de Cassation, 1980 JCB 440.
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In the S.A. Vandenbosch case, the manufacturer, a Belgian subsidi-
ary of an American company, entered into a distributorship agreement
of unlimited duration in 1965. The agreement contained a clause
granting the manufacturer the right to terminate the agreement with a
thirty day notice period in case the distributor's orders for a given year
did not reach a minimum of B.F. 7.500.000,-. The orders for 1970 re-
mained below the agreed minimum and the manufacturer terminated
the agreement in May of 1971 with a thirty day notice period. The
distributor questioned the validity of this termination and sued for
damages before the Tribunal de Commerce of Brussels. 17 9 The court
rejected plaintiff s claim and gave full effect to the resolutive clause of
the agreement, which according to the court, constituted the law be-
tween the parties.
Hence, the thirty day notice period was sufficient and no addi-
tional indemnity was due. The decision was upheld by the Cour
d'appel of Brussels80 and by the Cour de Cassation.'8 ' The latter
ruled, on the basis of Article 1134 of the Belgian Civil Code, 182 that
parties are free to insert an express resolutive clause in their agreement
unless the agreement pertains to a subject for which the Legislature has
restricted or forbidden the use of such clauses.18 3 However, the court
held that this was not the case for exclusive distributorship agree-
ments. 1 4 Parties are thus completely free to insert such clauses in their
agreement.
One of the most controversial and most interesting aspects of the
Belgian Statute on distributorship agreements concerns its scope and
application.1 85 The many advantages granted to distributors under
179 Unpublished decision.
180 Unpublished decision.
181 Judgment of Apr. 19, 1979, Cour de Cassation, 1980 JCB 440.
182 Code Civil [C. civ.] art. 1134 (Belg.). This article states that the terms of an agreement have
the force of law for the parties. Cf. C. civ. art. 1134 (Fr.) and note 118 supra (an identical provi-
sion in the French Code Civil).
183 Judgment of Apr. 19, 1979, Cour de Cassation, 1980 JCB 440.
184 Id.
185 See Malherbe, Les concessions de vente en droit beige et communautaire, 1973 JCB 53; Le-
doux, LVIppiication de i'Article 5, 1 ° et 5' de la Convention de Bruxelles en Matibre de Concession
de Vente, 1975 JT 581; Ledoux, Les Concessions de Vente en Belgique el les R.gies de Compbtence
de la C.EE., 1975 JT 217; Bricmont & Philips, De la Comp~tence Territoriale du Juge Belge,
d'aprs 1a Convention Conmnunautaire du 27septembre 1968, en Matitre de Rbsiliation, avec Prbavis,
d'un Contrat de Concession de Vente & B ure Indkterminee, 1975 JT 475; Van Der Elst, Concessions
de Vente en Beigique et Rbgies de Comp#tence de la convention CEE du 27septembre 1968, 1976
JT 733; Weser, L'articie 5, alinta 1er de la Convention de Bruxelles du 27 september 1968 et la
concession de vente exclusive, 1976 JT 323; Hayward, Aurisdiction under the Belgian Law of Termi-
nation of Exclusive Distributors: an Exercise in Conflicts of Law and Jurisdiction, 1979 INT'L LAW.
128.
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Belgian law may urge manufacturers to try to avoid this application by
inserting a choice of foreign law clause in their agreements.
To counter such attempts, Article 4 of the Statute stipulates that
whenever a distributorship agreement produces effects, even partly, on
Belgian territory, then the terminated distributor is allowed to maintain
an action against the manufacturer in Belgium, either before the court
of his own domicile or the court of the grantor's domicile, if the latter is
located in Belgium. The Belgian judge must apply Belgian law. 8 '
Thus, a foreign manufacturer cannot evade the Belgian Statute simply
by inserting a choice of foreign law clause in the distributorship agree-
ment. The Belgian distributor can always bring an action against the
manufacturer in Belgium, in which case Belgian law will apply,
notwithstanding the choice of foreign law clause.
Belgium has signed a number of bilateral and multilateral treaties
containing clauses that may be incompatible with Article 4 of the Stat-
ute, which requires application of Belgian law. In particular, the so-
called Brussels Convention of 1968187 stipulates in Article 17, that par-
ties to an agreement, of whom at least one is domiciled in a state that
signed and ratified the Convention,' can confer exclusive jurisdiction
regarding all disputes arising from the agreement, to the courts of a
signatory state. In view of Belgium's international obligations under
the Brussels Convention, Belgian courts should therefore decline juris-
diction if the distributorship agreement contains an express choice of
forum clause in favor of the courts of the manufacturer's domicile, pro-
vided the latter is located in a signatory state."19
The next question to address is what happens if a contract between
a Belgian distributor and a foreign manufacturer does not contain a
choice of foreign forum clause and the manufacturer has his domicile
in a signatory state? Should the Belgian Court then hold that it has no
jurisdiction to hear claims against foreign suppliers for termination in-
demnities? This issue has long been debated by Belgian legal schol-
ars. 190 Two theories have been advanced. The first theory holds that
since the manufacturer must eventually pay indemnities to the distribu-
186 Law of July 27, 1961, MONITEUR BELGE Oct. 5, 1961, as amended by Law of Apr. 13, 1971,
MONITEUR BELGE Apr. 21, 1971, art. 4 (Beig.).
187 Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Mat-
ters, Sept. 27, 1968, 21 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 304) 36 (1978) (enteredintoforce on Feb. 1, 1973).
188 As of this date, the Convention has been ratified by all of the EEC Member States, see note
2 supra, except for the United Kingdom, Denmark, and Greece.
189 Judgment of Dec. 9, 1975, Cour d'appel, Mons; Judgment of Jan. 15, 1976, Tribunal de
Commerce, Brussels, 1976 JT 210. See also G. BRICMONT & J.M. PHILIPS, supra note 139, at 113.
190 See note 185 supra and G. BRICMONT & J.M. PHILIPS, supra note 139, at 95-116.
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tor and further since Article 1247 of the Belgian Civil Code states that a
claim for payment of a sum of money must be asserted in the domicile
of the debtor, then the courts of the debtor's country would be compe-
tent under Article 5, 1 * of the Brussels Convention. This article regard-
ing contractual obligations stipulates that the defendant who is
domiciled in a signatory state may be validly sued before the courts of
another signatory state in which the obligation is to be performed. Ac-
cording to Article 1247 of the Belgian Civil Code, this would be the
manufacturer's domicile. Hence, under Article 5, 1 of the Brussels
Convention, jurisdiction would lie with the courts of the manufac-
turer's domicile. The latter might then apply local law.191 Under the
second theory, the distributorship agreement would be considered as a
whole and the obligation to pay indemnities could only arise after a
Belgian judge ruled on the issue.' 92 Hence only Belgian courts would
be competent.
On April 6, 1978, the Cour de Cassation resolved the issue. The
Court ruled that the obligation to pay a termination indemnity is not
an autonomous obligation, but a compensatory obligation that replaces
a reasonable notice term. 193 This notice term must be executed in
Belgium. Thus, Belgium is the place of execution for the principal ob-
ligation, namely to give a notice term. It is, therefore, also the place of
execution for the replacing obligation to pay an equitable indemnity.
Hence, Belgian courts are competent under Article 5(1) of the Brussels
Convention unless the contract contains an express choice of foreign
forum clause. 94
In the AUDI-N.S. U. v. Adelin Petit case,'95 the Cour de Cassation
ruled that parties to a distributorship agreement producing effects in
Belgian territory, cannot escape the application of Belgian law by in-
serting in their agreement both a clause providing for arbitration
abroad and a choice of foreign law clause. 196 The foreign award will
not be granted recognition and enforcement by Belgian courts. Article
5(2) of the New York Convention of June 10, 1958 on Recognition and
191 Judgment of May 30, 1974, Tribunal de Commerce, Brussels, 1974 JT 676. See also Le-
doux, note 185 supra.
192 Judgment of May 26, 1970, Tribunal de Commerce, Brussels, 1970 JT 532. See G.
BRICMONT & J.M. PmLu's, supra note 139, at 105; Vander Elst, supra note 185, at 737.
193 Judgment of Apr. 8, 1978, Cour de Cassation, 1978 Arresten van Hof van Cassatie 898.
194 Id.
195 Judgment of June 28, 1979, Cour de Cassation, 1979 JT 625.
196 E. Hayward observes in this respect that in the absence of a choice of foreign law clause, the
arbitrators might themselves find Belgian law to be applicable. See Hayward, Supra note 185, at
135.
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Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 7 as well as Article 6(2) of
the European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration,'
both of which are in effect in Belgium,' 99 stipulate that a judge will
hold an arbitration clause invalid if, according to the law of the forum
(that is, his own law), the dispute is not arbitrable. According to the
Cour de Cassation, the issues relating to the termination of distributor-
ship agreements producing effects in the Belgian territory are not arbi-
trable.20 Hence, foreign arbitration awards will not be granted
recognition and enforcement in Belgium.
Agency
Belgium does not have specific legislation regarding agents. At-
tempts to pass such legislation have been made in the past.20 ' There is
a consensus among Belgian lawyers that the Belgian Legislature is ap-
parently awaiting the passage of the EEC Directive on Commercial
Agents which will be discussed later in this article. 2  Due to the com-
plete lack of statutory guidance on the issue, questions relating to the
termination of an agency agreement under Belgian law are highly
uncertain.0 3
The greatest termination problem arises when an agency contract
is concluded for an indefinite period of time. According to some
courts, such contracts may be terminated ad nutum, ie., without a no-
tice period and without an indemnity for the terminated agent unless
the contract provides otherwise.204 Other courts require the principal
to give the agent a reasonable notice period, unless the termination is
197 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997.
198 484 U.N.T.S. 349.
199 The New York Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
note 197 supra, took effect in Belgium on Nov. 26, 1975; the European Convention on Interna-
tional Commercial Arbitration, note 198 supra, took effect on Jan. 7, 1976. See Ledoux, La Con-
vention de New York et la Convention Europbenne sur l'arbitrage international et ler concessions de
vente en Belgique, 1976 JT 305.
200 Judgment of June 8, 1979, Cour de Cassation, 1979 JT 625.
201 The Cudell, Verbaanderd and Dr6ze Bill was introduced in Parliament in 1962, 1961-62
Parlementaire Documenten, Kamer van Volksvertegenwoordigers nr 217. The Cudell, Radoux,
Gillet and Saint-Rdmy Bill was introduced in Parliament in 1966, 1965-66 Parlementaire Docu-
menten, Kamer van Volksvertegenwoordigers nr 272. The Government (Minister of Justice) also
introduced a bill into Parliament in 1969, 1968-69 Parlementaire Documenten, Kamer van Volk-
svertegenwoordigers nr 283-1. All these bills provide a minimum notice period in case of unilat-
eral termination of an agency contract of unlimited duration.
202 See text accompanying notes 255-300 infra.
203 See Taquet, La Rupture du Contrat dAgent Commercia 1969 JT 165.
204 See, e.g., Judgment of Apr. 20, 1961, Cour d'appel, Liege, [1961] 11 Pasicrisie 254; Judgment
of Feb. 3, 1960, Cour d'appel, Brussels, 1960 JCB 279.
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justified by a serious fault of the agent.2 5 In the absence of a notice
period, the agent would be entitled to an indemnity covering the loss of
commissions which he normally would have earned during the notice
period.20 6 The Court of Appeals of Antwerp, in a recent and as yet
isolated decision, awarded the terminated agent compensation for the
loss of clients.20 7 The maximum notice period that has ever been





Agency contracts in Italy are governed by Articles 1742-1753 of
the Italian Civil Code2 ' and the provisions of several so-called Collec-
tive Economic Agreements. 212 The Collective Economic Agreements
(AEC) are the result of collective bargaining between Associations
composed of respectively, representatives of agents and principals.
They complement the provisions of the Civil Code, which is formu-
lated in very broad terms. There are two sets of Collective Economic
Agreements, one for Agents of Industrial Enterprises and one for
Agents of Commercial Enterprises.2 13  Both have been periodically
modified resulting in a progression of more favorable conditions for the
205 Judgment of Jan. 16, 1956, Cour d'appel, Ghent, 1957 Revue Critique de Jurisprudence
Beige 310.
206 Judgment of Feb. 4, 1980, Cour d'appel, Antwerp, 1980 JCB 456.
207 The amount was fixed ex aequo et bono on B.F. 75,000. Id.
208 See Taquet, supra note 203, at 165.
209 For a more detailed discussion, see G. LA VILLA & M. CARTELLA, note 17 supra; R. BALDI,
IL CONTRATTO DI AGENZIA (Milan, 1971); F. BORTOLoTTI, GUIDA ALLA STIPULAZAIONE DI
CONTRATTI CON AGENT1 E CONCESSIONARI ALL' ESTERO (Turin, 1976).
210 In Italian, agenzio.
211 In Italian, Codice Civile or Cc. The old Italian Commericial Code of 1882 had no specific
provisions on commercial agency contracts. Except for a number of local customs, parties to
agency contracts were completely free to regulate their respective rights and duties in the individ-
ual agency contracts. In 1908 the Italian Federation of Commercial Agents worked out a Regula-
tion on Commercial Agency. From 1920 on, the Legislature worked out several drafts to insert
provisions in the commercial code relating to agents. These drafts are known under the names of
the Vivante Draft (1925), D'Amelio Draft (1925) and the Grandi Draft (1940). They were incor-
porated in the Civil Code instead of in the Commercial Code. In 1942 the Italian Legislature
decided to abolish the distinction between the Commercial Code and the Civil Code. The provi-
sions of the Commercial Code were incorporated into the Civil Code. See A. DE THEUX, supra
note 1, at 71. For more details on the historic evolution of the Italian legislation on commercial
agency, see A. FORMIGGINI, IL CONTRATrO DI AGENZiA 2 (Turin, 1958); Rotondi, Contratto di
agenzia, ausillari dipendenti dell' impresa e mediazione, 1961 RIV. DIR. COM. 241-270.
212 In Italian, Accordi Economici Collectivi, usually abbreviated as AEC or AEI.
213 See A. DE THEUX, supra note 1, at 72.
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agent.21 4
A distinction should be made between those agreements declared
effective erga omnes by Presidential Decree and those agreements
which are only binding on members of the Associations which have
concluded them. The basic agreements for both categories of agents,
industrialized and commercial, have been approved by Presidential
Decree215 but subsequent amendments have as yet not been declared
binding erga omnes.216 A careful examination of the exact scope of the
agreement on which an agent in a particular case bases his claim, is
therefore essential.
Agency contracts in Italy may be entered into for a limited period
of time or indefinitely. The former contract terminates upon the expi-
ration of the agreed upon term. Neither a notice period nor goodwill
compensation to the terminated agent is required unless the parties
have expressly so agreed. 217 The underlying rationale for this rule is
that, in agency contracts of short duration, agents tend to create less
goodwill than in contracts of unlimited duration.218
The AEC of December 18, 1974 prescribes that in contracts for a
fixed period of time, exceeding six months, the principal must inform
the agent at least sixty days before the expiration of the contract
whether he intends to extend the contract's duration.219 The collective
agreements further specify that upon renewal a contract of limited du-
ration is converted into a contract of unlimited duration. 220 Advanced
214 For agents of commercial enterprises, the basic AEC dates from June 30, 1938, approved by
the Decree no. 1784 of Nov. 17, 1938. It is presently still in force. It has been modified by the
AEC of Oct. 13, 1958, Mar. 19, 1964 and July 1, 1971. The AEC of June 30, 1938 is also the basic
AEC for agents of industrial enterprises. It has, however, been replaced by the AEI of June 20,
1956, which has been slightly modified by the AEI of Aug. 2, 1965 and of Dec. 18, 1974.
215 The basic AEC of Nov. 17, 1938 has been approved by a Presidential Decree issued on the
basis of Law no. 369 of Nov. 23, 1944 (art. 43). The AEC of Oct. 13, 1958 has been approved by
Presidential Decree no. 1842 of Dec. 26, 1960, issued on the basis of Law no. 741 of July 14, 1959.
The AEI of June 20, 1956 has been approved by Presidential Decree no. 145 of Jan. 16, 1961,
issued on the basis of Law no. 741 of July 14, 1959.
216 The AEC of Mar. 19, 1964 as well as the AEI's of Aug. 2, 1965, June 30, 1969 and Dec. 18,
1974 have not been approved by the Presidential Decree. They are therefore not applicable erga
omnes. Their application is limited to parties who adhere to the Associations that have signed the
AEC or AEI.
217 See G. LA VILLA & M. CARTELLA, supra note 17, at 109.
218 Id.
219 AEC of Dec. 18, 1974, at art. 3.
220 Note that the AEC's applicable to representatives of commercial enterprises differ from
those applicable to representatives of industrial enterprises. The former rule is contained in an
AEC which only applies to parties who are members of the trade association adhering to it (AEC
of March 19, 1964 at art. 1). In the case of representatives of industrial enterprises, the rule in the
AEC of June 30, 1969, at art. 3, is applicable to all contracts. See G. LA VILLA & M. CARTELLA,
supra note 17, at 110.
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termination is permitted if one of the parties has committed a fault of
such gravity that it renders continuation of the commercial relationship
impossible.221 The innocent party, whether principal or agent, is then
entitled to claim damages.2
According to Article 1750 C.C., agency contracts for an unlimited
duration may be terminated by either party by either giving notice to
the other party within the time limits set forth in the AECs or paying a
corresponding indemnity. The length of the notice period is not fixed
by the Civil Code but by the AECs. The latter typically require a three
month notice period.2 3 However, parties are free to deviate from this
period in the individual contract as long as the deviation is in favor of
the agent. Hence, the contract may impose a longer notice period on
the principal and/or may allow the agent to give a shorter notice period
than required under the AECs.224
The Civil Code allows the terminating party to replace this notice
period by an indemnity225 consisting of one-half the amount of com-
missions paid to the agent during the preceding twelve months for each
month of notice eliminated.226
In addition to a notice period or replacing indemnity, upon termi-
nation of a contract of unlimited duration, the principal must pay the
agent a special indemnity "in the amount established by the AECs, by
collective contracts or by usage, or, lacking these, by the judge on an
equitable basis." 7 This indemnity is also due when the agency rela-
tionship is terminated because of an agent's permanent and total disa-
bility or even his death. In the latter case, the heirs should receive the
agent's indemnity.22 8
The original text of Article 1751 of the Civil Code, as enacted in
1942, provided that the granting of this special indemnity was condi-
tioned on a finding that the relationship had not been terminated for
reasons imputable to the agent, such as an agent's unjustified with-
drawal from a contract. This requirement was eliminated by Statute
911 of October 15, 1971. Presently, compensation to the agent upon
termination of a contract of indefinite duration is always due, even if
the termination is caused by a fault of the agent. Under those circum-
221 See G. LA VILLA & M. CARTELLA, supra note 17, at 113.
222 Id. at 114.
223 See, ag., AEC of June 30, 1938, at art. 7; AEC of June 20, 1956, at art. 8.
224 See G. LA VILLA & M. CARTELLA, supra note 17, at 116.
225 C.c. art. 1750 (Italy).
226 AEC of June 30, 1938, at art. 7; AEC of June 20, 1956, at art. 8.
227 C.c. art. 1751 (Italy).
228 Id.
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stances, however, the principal may be awarded damages. The amount
of these damages, though, must be fixed by the court and consequently,
cannot be deducted by the principal from the termination indemnity
that has to be granted to the agent.229
The statutory indemnity of Article 1751 C.C. is paid out of funds
collected by means of obligatory payments made by the principal to
ENASARCO.2 30 ENASARCO pays the indemnity directly to the
agent or his heirs upon termination of the agency relationship. The
amount of the terminal compensation payable to an agent is calculated
according to detailed regulations contained in the AECs on the basis of
a certain percentage of the commission paid each year during the exist-
ence of the contract. The greater the amount of annual commission
earned the lower the percentage.23'
The AECs also provide for disability and old age pension treat-
ment for agents, regardless of whether their contracts were for a limited
or an unlimited period of time. However both principal and agent
must contribute to that fund. The principal must pay to ENASARCO
a certain percentage of all sums payable to the agent under the con-
tract. The principal is liable for the amount of the agent's contribu-
tions, if the agent fails to make these payments. Consequently, in order
to ensure payment, the principal may withhold the agent's share of con-
tributions from the amounts payable to the agent and send both his and
the agent's withholdings to ENASARCO.232
In addition to the statutory indemnity of Article 1751 C.C., which
is always due to an agent, a supplementary indemnity of three percent
of the total amount of commissions earned by the agent during the en-
tire period of the contract, must be granted to the agent in case of ter-
mination of a contract of indefinite duration without any fault on the
agent's part. This indemnity, which was introduced for the first time by
Section 10 of the AEC of December 18, 1974, applies only to transac-
tions concluded after December 18, 1974. This indemnity is compensa-
tion for goodwill or increase in clientele brought about by the agent,
and is to be paid directly to the agent by the principal, in addition to
the statutory indemnity of Article 1751 C.C., which is being paid
through ENASARCO.
229 See G. LA VILLA & M. CARTELLA, supra note 17, at 121.
230 See text accompanying note 19 supra.
231 See G. LA VILLA & M. CARTELLA, supra note 17, at 121 and 132.
232 BUSINEss GUIDE TO EUROPE, COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH).
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Distributorshp
Italy does not have a specific statute regulating distributorship
agreements.233 The prevailing opinion among Italian scholars is that a
distributorship agreement is a contract sui generis and involves ele-
ments of the law of sale, mandate and supply-contracts.234
Distributorship contracts may be terminated unilaterally, even if
parties have not expressly agreed to this possibility.235 The terminating
party should, however, observe the notice period agreed upon in the
contract or notice period established by usage, or if neither of these
standards apply, a reasonable length of notice taking into consideration
the na ture of the supply."36 The Court of Appeals of Genoa held in
this respect, that a reasonable length of notice is the same for agents
and distributors.237
Both manufacturer and distributor may terminate the agreement
adnutum, ie. without a notice period, in case of breach of contract by
the other party. The terminating party (manufacturer or distributor)
can claim damages for the loss it suffered.2 38 However, the distributor
is not permitted to claim compensation for the goodwill he created for
the manufacturer's products.239
OTHER EEC MEMBER STATES
In the previous sections, we examined the statutes and case law on
agency and distributorship agreements in four EEC Member States:
Germany, France, Belgium and Italy. The case law regarding agency
and distributor agreements in the other EEC Member States will be
briefly discussed in the following sections.
United Kingdom
In the United Kingdom there is no specific legislation governing
the status of agents or distributors. 240 The contracted terms conse-
quently constitute the law of the agreement. The main grounds for ter-
mination of an agency and distributorship agreement are:
233 See A. DE THEUX, supra note 1, at 3 10-11.
234 See G. LA VILLA & M. CARTELLA, supra note 17, at 180; A. DE THEUX, supra note 1, at
310-13.
235 See G. LA VILLA & M. CARTELLA, supra note 17, at 188.
236 C.c. art. 1569 (Italy).
237 Judgment of July 14, 1955, cited by G. LA VILLA & M. CARTELLA, supra note 17, at 188.
238 Id. at 189.
239 Id. at 190.
240 See HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND 529 (1973).
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(1) expiration of the agreement's term; (2) agent's or principal's death;
and (3) the principal's bankruptcy. Agency and distributorship agree-
ments concluded for an indefinite period of time may be terminated at
any moment by either principal or agent without observing a notice
period. A reasonable notice period, however, would be required if the
relationship between the parties is analogous to that between employer
and employee.
In the case of Martin Baker Aircraft Lid, Canadian Fight Equi7-
ment Ltd., Martin Baker Aircraft Co. Ltd v. Murison, the Queen's
Bench Division held that a reasonable notice period is required if the
agent must spend a great deal of time and money on the contract and is
subject to restrictions as to the sale of competing brands.241 However,
no goodwill compensation is required if not stipulated in the contract.
Netherlands
Dutch law does not have any specific provisions regarding distrib-
utorship agreements. 42 The general law of contracts applies and in
theory all clauses of a distributorship agreement are freely
negotiable.243
Agency contracts, on the other hand, are subject to Articles 74-74s
of the Dutch Commercial Code.2 " Agency contracts concluded for a
definite period of time terminate upon expiration of the term. How-
ever, a right of anticipated notice may be provided contractually. If the
relationship is tacitly continued after expiration of the term, the con-
tract is deemed to be prolonged by operation of law on the same terms
and for a period of time not to exceed one year. 45
Agency contracts concluded for an indefinite period of time, or for
a fixed period with a contractual right of anticipated termination, may
be terminated with observance of a notice period. If no shorter term of
notice has been agreed upon by the parties, the notice term shall be
four months for agreements which have been in force three years or
less; if the agreement has been in force for four to six years, the term of
notice shall be five or six months respectively. In no event may the
contractual term of notice be less than one month.
24 6
Summary termination is possible but gives rise to a claim for in-
241 [1955] 2 Q.B. 556.
242 S. SCHUIT, J. VAN DER BEEK & B. RAAP, DUTCH BUSINESS LAW 119 (1978).
243 Id.
244 Wetboek van Koophandel [W.v.K.] Boek I, Titel 4, art. 74-74(s) (Neth.).
245 W.v.K. art. 74(i) (Neth.).
246 W.v.K. art. 74(j) (Neth.).
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demnification to the terminated party unless justified by "urgent rea-
sons." 247 The concept of "urgent reasons" is defined in the law as
"circumstances of such a nature that the terminating party cannot rea-
sonably be required to continue the agreement, even not tempo-
rarily."24 In such an event notice of termination should be given
immediately, but a period of notice is not required. If indemnification
is due, it will be given either in the form of an amount equal to the
commission which would have been earned during the term of notice
and this amount may be mitigated by the court, or in the form of com-
pensation for actually incurred damages,24 9 in which case the party de-
manding compensation must prove the extent of such damages. If the
agent has increased the value of the principars business by creating or
developing the goodwill for the principal, then the agent is entitled to a
"suitable compensation" for his efforts.25 Unless a higher amount has
been agreed upon, compensation shall not exceed the equivalent of one
year's commission, calculated on the basis of the average commission
earned during the last five years or the average of the entire contract
period, if this period is shorter than five years. 25 1 The relevant provi-
sion of law thus only indicates a maximum. It is likely that in the event
of disputes regarding the amount of compensation due, Dutch courts
will grant the agent the maximum amount.25 2
Compensation is in principle due regardless of whether the agent
or the principal terminated the relationship.5 3 Only equitable consid-
erations can exclude an award of a compensation. However, claims for
goodwill compensation or for indemnification expire one year after the
occurrence of the circumstances from which the claim originates.25 4
Denmark
Denmark does not have a specific statute regulating the termina-
tion of agency and distributorship agreements. This matter is left com-
pletely to the discretion of the contracting parties. However, Danish
courts do require the terminating party to give a reasonable notice to
the terminated party. A notice period of three to six months is usually
247 W.v.K. art. 74(1) (Neth.).
248 Id.
249 W.v.K. art. 74(n) (Neth.).
250 W.v.Y- art. 74(o) (Neth.).
251 Id.
252 See S. SCHurT, J. VAN DER BEEK & B. RAAP, supra note 242, at 118.
253 Id.
254 W.v.K. art. 74(a) (Neth.).
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considered sufficient in this respect. The terminated party has no right
to damages for loss of clientele.
Greece
Greece, which recently joined the Common Market, does not have
any specific legislation regarding distributorship agreements. Agency
contracts are governed by provisions of the Greek Civil Code, which




Having completed an overview of the national laws regulating the
termination of agency and distributorship agreements in a number of
EEC Member States, this article will next examine current attempts by
European authorities256 to approximate the national laws of the Mem-
ber States in the area of commercial representation. These efforts go
back to 1976,257 when the EEC Commission presented a proposal to the
Council of Ministers for an EEC Directive to approximate the laws of
the Member States relating to self-employed commercial agents. The
Draft Directive has been amended over the years by the Commission;
the latest draft was completed on January 29, 1979.258 It is this draft
that will be examined.
At this very moment the Council of Ministers is in its first reading
of the Draft. A second and possibly even a third reading will follow. It
will take at least another six to twelve months before the Directive is
finally issued. Member States will then have another eighteen months
255 See Di Marco, Prospettive di un armonizzazione del contratto di agenzia della Communita
Europea, 16 DIR. COMMENITARIO E DELGLI SCAMPI INT. 445-55 (1977); Vanderhaeghe & Jones,
Current Developments in European Agency Law, 12 INTL Law. 671-75 (1978); Lando, The EEC
Draft Directive relating to self-employed commercial agents, the English Law Commission versus the
EC Commission, 1980 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT FUR AUSLANDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES
PRIVATRECHT 1-16.
256 For EEC approximation matters the Council of Ministers has the authority to issue Direc-
tives under article 100 of the EEC Treaty. The Council decides on a proposal of the Commission
after gaining advice from the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee.
Member States are given a limited period of time to bring their domestic legislation in line with
the Directive, either by amending existing legislation or by introducing new legislation. The
Council decision to issue a Directive must be unanimous.
257 Proposal of Dec. 17, 1976 for a Council Directive to Coordinate the Laws of the Member
States Relating to Commercial Agents, 20 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 13) 2 (1977), amendedby the
Proposal of Jan. 29, 1979, 22 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 56) 5 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Draft
Directive].
258 Id.
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to bring their national laws into line with the Directive." 9
The proposed Directive covers only self-employed commercial
agents. Article 2 defines such a person as "a self-employed intermedi-
ary who has continuing authority. . . to negotiate and/or to conclude
an unlimited number of commercial transactions in the name and for
the account of another person (. . . the principal). The agent may ar-
range his activities and use his time as he thinks fit." Thus, agent-em-
ployees and distributors are excluded from the scope of the proposed
Directive.260
As delineated in the Preamble of the Draft Directive,261 the Com-
mission presented this proposal to the Council because of the present
differences in the degree of protection granted to commerical agents,
which creates inequality in competition and results in the development
of barriers for commercial representation in the Community. This re-
sult contravenes the EEC Directive 64/224 of February 25, 1964,
whereby restrictions on the freedom of establishment and the freedom
to provide services relating to activities of intermediaries in commerce,
industry and small craft industries, were abolished.262 The Draft Di-
rective therefore provides for rules of protection which each Member
State must guarantee, in order to establish a uniform minimum level of
protection. Most provisions of the Draft Directive regulate the rela-
tionship between the commercial agent and the principal. They set out
the respective rights and duties of both parties and contain detailed
rules regarding remuneration, commissions, and termination.
The Draft Directive provides four grounds for the termination of
agency contracts: (1) expiration of the contract's term;263 (2) notice by
one of the parties; 264 (3) a serious fault by one of the parties or behavior
seriously inconsistent with the party's obligations;2 65 and (4) circum-
stances which make it impossible to perform the contract or which sub-
stantially undermine the commercial basis of the contract.266
Agency contracts entered into for a fixed period of time terminate
upon the expiration of that period.267 The Draft Directive further pro-
259 Id. at art. 36.
260 Id. at art. 3, which provides that "[t]his Directive does not apply ... to intermediaries
who are wage or salary earning employees . . . (or) to intermediaries who act in their own
name. ."
261 Id. at art. 5.
262 7 J.0. Comm. EUR. (No. L 56) 869 (1964).
263 Draft Directive, supra note 257, at art. 25.
264 Id. at art. 26(1).
265 Id. at art. 27(l)(a).
266 Id. at art. 27(l)(b).
267 Id. at art. 25.
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vides that a contract for a fixed period, which continues to be per-
formed after expiration of that period, is deemed to be converted into a
contract of unlimited duration.268 Under the original 1976 version of
the Directive, parties could deviate from this rule by stipulating in their
agreement, that the contract would remain a contract of limited dura-
tion. However, this option was deleted in the 1979 version.269
Unlike many EEC Directives which contain an extensive list of
definitions, the Draft Directive on self-employed agents does not define
the concept "contract for a fixed or determinable period." It is there-
fore unclear whether under the Directive contracts with renewal clauses
for fixed periods of time are considered contracts of limited duration or
contracts of indefinite duration. This lack of precision is rather unfor-
tunate since this issue is controversial in at least two Member States,
namely France and Germany.270 In both these countries decisions by
the respective highest courts271 which hold that such contracts remain
contracts of limited duration, have been severely criticized by legal
scholars.272
The Belgian Legislature adopted an equitable solution for the
question of when a renewed agreement becomes a contract of unlim-
ited duration under the Belgian Law of July 27, 1961. On termination
of distributorship agreements, under this law, contracts of limited dura-
tion automatically convert into contracts of unlimited duration after
the second renewal, notwithstanding the fact that the original agree-
ment was amended.273 This solution would give the principal the op-
portunity to test the agent during a number of years without a final
commitment. At the same time it would guarantee to the agent the
benefits of protective statutory provisions once he has gone through
what could be characterized as a "trial period." Furthermore, the Bel-
gian solution would be consistent with the Commission's general policy
against the practices of indefinite renewals of contracts of limited dura-
tion, as indicated by the deletion of the words "unless otherwise agreed
on" in Article 25 of the 1979 version of the Draft Directive.274 Regard-
less of whether the Belgian solution is adopted, a clear explanation of
the Council's viewpoint on this issue is greatly needed.
A second and traditional method for terminating an agency con-
268 Id.
269 Id.
270 See text accompanying notes 32-37 and 88-93 supra.
271 Id.
272 Id.
273 See text accompanying notes 142-45 supra.
274 Draft Directive, supra note 257, at art. 25.
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tract, is by giving notice. Article 26 of the draft distributorship agree-
ment stipulates that when the agency contract is concluded for an
indefinite period of time, either the principal or agent may terminate it
by giving notice within the legally or contractually fixed notice period.
German and Dutch influence on the wording of Article 26 is obvious.
Similar to the national laws of Germany 75 and the Netherlands,276 the
Draft Directive contains a required minimum notice period, including
detailed instructions on how and when notice is to be given.2 77
Under the Draft Directive, the notice period must be at least one
month during the first year of the contract. This period increases by
fourteen days for each additional year the contract is fulfilled.278 Mem-
ber States, however, may prescribe a maximum period, which cannot
under any circumstances be less than six months. Notice must be given
in writing. In addition, the notice period must be the same for both
parties and coincide with the end of a calendar month.
A third method for terminating an agency agreement is by imme-
diate termination without notice. Article 27 of the Draft Directive pro-
vides that a principal or agent may terminate the contract without
observing the contractual or legal notice period, if any of the following
circumstances arise: (1) the other party's conduct is seriously inconsis-
tent with his obligations; (2) the other party has committed a fault; and
(3) the performance of the contract has become either impossible, or
seriously impaired, or the commercial basis of the contract is under-
mined due to unexpected circumstances. Under these circumstances,
the party at fault is held liable in damages to the other party.27 9
In the original 1976 version of the Draft Directive, only two
grounds were provided for immediate termination of the agency agree-
ments, namely (1) a fault by one of the parties; and (2) unexpected
circumstances seriously impairing the performance of the contract or
rendering it impossible or undermining the commercial basis of the
contract.2"' By adding a third ground for immediate termination,
namely that a party's behavior is inconsistent with his obligations
under the contract, the Commission apparently intended to emphasize
that a fault by the terminated party is not a strict prerequisite for the
possibility of immediate termination of the agreement. This change re-
flects the German influence of the concept of "urgent reason," which
275 See text accompanying notes 42-48 supra.
276 See text accompanying note 246 supra.
277 Draft Directive, supra note 257, at art. 26.
278 Id.
279 Id. at art. 27.
280 Id.
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under German law is not a synonym for fault.2 ' However, this distinc-
tion seems rather academic since in practice the dividing line between
fault and "behaviour inconsistent with a party's obligation under the
contract" is extremely difficult to determine and the Draft Directive
contains no guidelines on that issue.
Both the principal and agent are liable to the other party in dam-
ages282 if either has not observed the proper notice period provided for
in the contract or by law. If the principal does not observe the notice
period, the agent is entitled to claim a lump-sum indemnity instead of
damages.283 The indemnity is calculated on the basis of the agent's
average remuneration during the preceding twelve months. The in-
demnity covers the unexpired period of the contract, subject to a maxi-
mum period of two years.284
The Draft Directive also provides compensation for the loss of
goodwill for the agent or his heirs if the following three conditions are
met:2 85
(1) the agent brought in new customers to the principal or appreciably
extended the volume of business with the existing customers;
(2) substantial benefit will continue to accrue to the principal as a result
of the agent's efforts;
(3) termination of the contract results in the agent's not receiving remu-
neration for transactions negotiated after the contract ended. 86
A minimum and a maximum goodwill compensation is prescribed by
the Directive. The minimum compensation should amount to one
tenth of the agent's annual remuneration, calculated on the basis of the
agent's average earnings during the preceding five years. The maxi-
mum compensation should be the agent's average annual remunera-
tion.287 In the original 1976 draft this maximum was twice the agent's
average annual compensation. 8
The Directive further provides that the right to goodwill indemnity
cannot be contracted out or restricted.2 89 This right must be exercised
within a period of three months following termination of the con-
tract.290 However, the agent has no right to goodwill compensation if
281 See text accompanying note 50 supra.
282 Draft Directive, supra note 257, at art. 28.
283 Id.
284 Id.
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(1) the principal terminated or could have terminated the contract
under Article 27(1)(a) of the Directive;29' (2) the principal maintains
the contract with the agent's successor, who was introduced by the
agent himself or by his heirs;292 and (3) the agent himself has termi-
nated the contract without giving the appropriate notice and without
being able to justify this on the basis of Article 27.293
The original 1976 draft provided that starting January 1, 1980,
Member States were to adopt the changes in their domestic legislation
necessary to comply with the Directive.294 The changes were to be ap-
plicable on July 1, 1980.295 It is clear that this deadline has not been
met. The Directive will be issued with at least two years delay. One
reason: for this delay is the severe criticism that the 1976 draft Directive
received from the English Law Commission. 96 Not only do the con-
cepts in the Directive have a different meaning on the Continent than
in the United Kingdom,297 but in a report on the proposed Directive
submitted by the English Law Commission and presented to Parlia-
ment, the Draft Directive is described as "badly drafted, unclear, am-
biguous, and internally inconsistent.' 298
The Law Commission questions the need for the protection pro-
vided in the draft for agents. According to the Commission, agents in
England are in no need of such protection. The Commission states:
We do not know whether the present law sufficiently protects the social
and economic needs of manufacturers' agents. It may be that they often
have unequal bargaining power as compared with their principals, al-
though it must be remembered that in English commerce and industry not
all manufacturers are large corporations of great bargaining power and
not all manufacturers' agents are one-man business [sic] of poor financial
standing. It may of course be that there is a mischief, and that manufac-
turers' agents do, as they contend, require special protection from English
law. Such limited consultations as we have been able to engage in leave
us in doubt as to whether this is so .... 299
As one commentator pointed out,3" the first criticisms concern differ-
ences in legal concepts and poor drafting techniques which can be rem-
edied. However, differences in social conditions, for example,
291 Id. at art. 31. See text accompanying notes 279 and 280 supra.
292 Draft Directive, supra note 257, at art. 31.
293 Id.
294 Id. at art. 36.
295 Id.
296 See Lando, note 255 supra.
297 For an explanation of the differences in the concept of "agent," see id. at 4.
298 Partly reprinted in Lando, supra note 255, at 3.
299 Id. at 6.
300 Id.
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determining the need or desirability of proposed legislation, is a harder
task to overcome.
CONCLUSION
The field of agency and distributorship agreements in the EEC
Member States is in an evolutionary stage. With respect to agency con-
tracts, the Member States must shortly bring their legislation in line
with the proposed EEC Directive" ' on this subject. This will not pose
any substantial problem for Germany, since the present German legis-
lation regarding agents, 30 2 was to a large extent a model for the Direc-
tive. Italy,3° 3 France30 4 and the Netherlands30 5 presently have
legislation on the books which is more or less similar to the proposed
Directive and is easily adaptable to the new proposal. Belgium 6 and
Denmark,0 7 on the other hand, will have to issue completely new legis-
lation in order to comply with the Directive. The United Kingdom
faces the hardest task of all Member States in complying with the Di-
rective because not only is the Draft Directive a typical product of
Continental European civil law,3 °8 but mainly because the English au-
thorities believe that social conditions in the United Kingdom are such
that English agents are in no need for such broad protection as pro-
vided by the Directive.3 9
Regarding distributorship agreements, there is common belief in
most Member States that distributors are entitled to protection upon
termination of the distributorship agreement. Hence, the courts of
most Member States have attempted to mitigate the hardships that fol-
low from a lack of specific legislation regarding distributors. A number
of different legal techniques are presently being used to reach this goal.
Harmonization of the laws in the different Member States seems highly
desirable. The Belgian Law of July 27, 196 1311 could provide a worka-
ble starting point for a common EEC approach in this field. One can
only hope that this harmonization will come about in the near future.
For as one author has stated in connection with the Draft Directive on
301 Draft Directive, note 257 supra.
302 See text accompanying notes 24-65 supra.
303 See text accompanying notes 209-232 supra.
304 See text accompanying notes 79-112 supra.
305 See text accompanying notes 242-254 supra.
306 See text accompanying notes 201-208 supra.
307 See text following note 254 supra.
308 See Lando, supra note 255, at 3-15. See also notes 296-300 and accompanying text supra.
309 Id.
310 See text accompanying notes 139-200 supra.




The aim of the Directive is to prevent distortion of competition. But by
covering only one group of selling intermediaries, the independent agents,
the Directive may very well aggravate an already existing distortion of
competition. 312
May these words of wisdom incite the Commission to soon present to
the Council a proposal for a Directive to coordinate the laws of the
Member States relating to distributors.
311 Draft Directive, note 257 supra.
312 See Lando, supra note 255, at 7.
